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Abstract
In this work we present novel differentially private identity (goodness-of-fit) testers for
natural and widely studied classes of multivariate product distributions: Gaussians in Rd
with known covariance and product distributions over {±1}d. Our testers have improved
sample complexity compared to those derived from previous techniques, and are the first
testers whose sample complexity matches the order-optimal minimax sample complexity
of O(d1/2/α2) in many parameter regimes. We construct two types of testers, exhibiting
tradeoffs between sample complexity and computational complexity. Finally, we provide
a two-way reduction between testing a subclass of multivariate product distributions and
testing univariate distributions, and thereby obtain upper and lower bounds for testing this
subclass of product distributions.
1 Introduction
A foundation of statistical inference is hypothesis testing : given two disjoint sets of probability
distributions H0 and H1, we want to design an algorithm T that takes a random sample X from
some distribution P ∈ H0∪H1 and, with high probability, determines whether P is in H0 or H1.
Hypothesis tests formalize yes-or-no questions about an underlying population given a random
sample from that population, and are ubiquitous in the physical, life, and social sciences, where
hypothesis tests with high confidence are the gold standard for publication in top journals.
In many of these applications—clinical trials, social network analysis, or demographic studies,
to name a few—this sample contains sensitive data belonging to individuals, in which case it is
crucial for the hypothesis test to respect these individuals’ privacy. It is particularly desirable
to guarantee differential privacy [DMNS06], which has become the de facto standard for the
analysis of private data. Differential privacy is used as a measure of privacy for data analysis
systems at Google [EPK14], Apple [Dif17], and the U.S. Census Bureau [DLS+17]. Differential
privacy and related notions of algorithmic stability are also crucial for statistical validity even
when confidentiality is not a direct concern, as they provide generalization guarantees in an
adaptive setting [DFH+15, BNS+16, RRST16].
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While differentially private hypothesis testing has been extensively studied (see Section 1.4),
almost all of this work has focused on low-dimensional distributions. The main contribution
of this work is to give novel algorithms for hypothesis testing problems on high-dimensional
distributions with improved sample complexity. In particular, we give differentially private
algorithms for the following natural and fundamental problems:
1. Given samples from a multivariate Gaussian P in Rd whose covariance is known to be the
identity, decide if P is N (0, Id×d) or is α-far from N (0, Id×d) in total variation distance.
2. Given samples from a product distribution P over {±1}d, decide if P is the uniform
distribution or is α-far from the uniform distribution in total variation distance.
3. Given samples from a product distribution P over {0, 1}d, decide if P is equal to some
given extremely biased distribution Q with mean E[Q]  O(1d ) or is α-far from Q in total
variation distance. In this case our tester achieves the provably optimal sample complexity.
The main challenge in solving these high-dimensional testing problems privately is that the
only known non-private test statistics for these problems have high sensitivity. That is, these test
statistics can potentially be highly brittle to changing a single one of the samples. We overcome
this challenge by identifying two effective test statistics with lower sensitivity. The first statistic
is obtained by a novel application of the method of Lipschitz extensions [BBDS13, KNRS13].
The second statistic is obtained using a new private preconditioning method [KLSU19], which
gives a computationally efficient tester, albeit with larger sample complexity in some parameter
regimes.
1.1 Background: Private Hypothesis Testing
We start by giving some background on private hypothesis testing. First, when we say that
we want a differentially private hypothesis tester for a pair H0,H1 over domain X , we mean
that we seek an algorithm A : X ∗ → {0, 1} such that
1. A is ε-differentially private in the worst case. That is, for every pair of samples X,X ′ ∈ X n
differing on one sample, A(X) and A(X ′) are ε-close in a precise sense (see Definition 2.1).
2. A correctly distinguishes H0 from H1 on average. If X = (X1, . . . ,Xn) is drawn i.i.d. from
some P ∈ H0 then A(X) outputs 0 with high probability, and similarly if P ∈ H1. We
call the minimum number of samples n such that A distinguishes H0 and H1 the sample
complexity of A.
Note that we require testers that are private in the worst case, even though we only require
accuracy on average. It is indeed important for privacy to be a worst-case notion, rather than
relying on the assumption that the data is sampled i.i.d. from some P ∈ H0 ∪ H1 because we
have no way of verifying this assumption (which may anyway be an oversimplified modeling
assumption), yet once privacy is lost it cannot be recovered.
There exists a black-box method for obtaining a differentially private tester from any non-
private tester A using the sample-and-aggregate framework [NRS07]. Specifically, given any
tester A with sample complexity n, we can obtain an ε-differentially private tester with sample
complexity O(n/ε). When ε is a constant, the reduction is within a constant factor of the best
sample complexity; however, the sample complexity blows up as ε→ 0.
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One can often obtain stronger results using a white-box approach. For example, suppose
P is a Bernoulli random variable and we aim to test if P = Ber(1/2) or P = Ber(1/2 + α).
Non-privately, Θ(1/α2) samples are necessary and sufficient. Thus the black-box approach gives
a sample complexity of Θ(1/α2ε).
However, if we work directly with the test statistic T (X) = 1n
∑n
i=1Xi, we can obtain privacy
by computing T (X) + Z where Z is drawn from an appropriate distribution with standard
deviation O(1/(εn)). One can now show that this private test succeeds using
n = O
(
1
α2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
non-private sc
+ O
(
1
αε
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
overhead for privacy
(1)
samples, which actually matches the non-private sample complexity up to a factor of 1 + o(1)
unless ε is very small. Our main contribution is to achieve qualitatively similar results for the
high-dimensional testing problem we have described above.
1.2 Our Results
Theorem 1.1 (Informal). There is a linear-time, ε-differentially private tester A that distin-
guishes the standard normal N (0, Id×d) from any normal N (µ, Id×d) that is α-far in total vari-
ation distance (or, equivalently, ‖µ‖2 ≥ α) using n = n(d, α, ε) samples for
n = O
(
d1/2
α2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
non-private sc
+ O˜
(
d1/2
αε
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
overhead for privacy
(2)
The sample complexity in Theorem 1.1 has an appealing form. One might even conjec-
ture that this sample complexity is optimal by analogy with the case of privately estimating a
Gaussian with known covariance, for which the sample complexity is Θ˜(d/α2+ d/αε) [KLSU19].
However, the next result shows that there is in fact an exponential-time private tester that has
even lower sample complexity in some range of parameters.
Theorem 1.2 (Informal). There is an exponential-time ε-differentially private tester A that
distinguishes the standard normal N (0, Id×d) from any normal N (µ, Id×d) that is α-far in total
variation distance using n = n(d, α, ε) samples for
n = O
(
d1/2
α2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
non-private sc
+ O˜
(
d1/2
αε1/2
+
d1/3
α2/3ε
+
d1/4
αε
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
overhead for privacy
(3)
The expression for the sample complexity in (3) is rather complex and somewhat difficult
to interpret and compare to (2). One way to simplify the comparison is to consider the range
of the privacy parameter ε where privacy comes for free, meaning the sample complexity is
dominated by the non-private term Θ(d1/2/α2). For the efficient algorithm, privacy comes for
free roughly when ε = Ω(α). For the computationally inefficient algorithm, however, one can
show that privacy comes for free roughly when ε = Ω(α2 + α/d1/4), which is better as soon as
both 1/α, d→∞.
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Our results for multivariate Gaussians follow by reduction from analogous results for uni-
formity testing of Boolean product distributions; that is, the problem of deciding, given samples
from a distribution over {±1}d, whether it is uniform or far from uniform.
Theorem 1.3 (Informal). There is a linear-time, ε-differentially private tester A that distin-
guishes the uniform distribution over {±1}d from any product distribution over {±1}d that is
α-far in total variation distance using n = O(d
1/2
α2
) + O˜(d
1/2
αε ) samples.
Theorem 1.4 (Informal). There is an exponential-time, ε-differentially private tester A that
distinguishes the uniform distribution over {±1}d from any product distribution over {±1}d that
is α-far in total variation distance using n = O(d
1/2
α2
) + O˜( d
1/2
αε1/2
+ d
1/3
α2/3ε
+ d
1/4
αε ) samples.
We, in fact, show how these two results on uniformity testing of Boolean product distributions
imply the analogue results of Theorem 1.1 and 1.2, via a reduction argument (Theorem 3.1).
For completeness, and to circumvent the constant-factor losses incurred by this reduction, we
also provide a self-contained (efficient) Gaussian testing algorithm in Appendix A.
Using a simple reduction (Corollary 5.2), Theorems 1.3 and 1.4 extend, with a constant
factor loss in sample complexity, to testing whether (i) a product distribution P over {±1}d is
either equal to some fixed product distribution Q such that every coordinate of E[Q] is bounded
away from −1 and +1, or (ii) whether P is far from Q in total variation distance.
Finally, we focus in Section 6 on a specific class of Boolean product distributions, which
we refer to as “extreme.” (Loosely speaking, a product distribution is extreme if each of its
marginals is O(1/d)-close to constant.) For this restricted class of Boolean product distributions,
we provide a two-way reduction argument showing that identity testing is equivalent to the
identity testing in the univariate setting. This allows us to transfer known lower bounds on
private univariate identity testing to our extreme product distribution class, which gives us the
first non-trivial lower bounds for privately testing identity of product distributions.
Theorem 1.5 (Informal). The sample complexity of privately testing identity of univariate
distributions over [d] and the sample complexity of privately testing identity of extreme product
distributions over {±1}d are equal, up to constant factors.
1.2.1 Useful Tools for Non-Private Hypothesis Testing
We highlight some tools in this paper which are useful for hypothesis testing, even without
privacy constraints.
• A reduction from testing the mean of a Gaussian, to testing uniformity of a product
distribution (Theorem 3.1).
• A reduction from testing identity to a “balanced” product distribution, to testing unifor-
mity of a product distribution (Corollary 5.2).
• An equivalence between testing identity over a domain of size d, and testing identity to an
“extreme” product distribution in d dimensions (Theorem 6.2).
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1.3 Techniques
To avoid certain technicalities involving continuous and unbounded data, we will describe
our tester for product distributions over {±1}d, rather than for Gaussians over Rd. However,
the techniques used in both cases are broadly similar.
First Attempts. A natural starting point is to study the asymptotically-optimal non-private
tester of Canonne et al. [CDKS17]. Let P be a distribution over {±1}d and letX = (X1, . . . ,Xn) ∈
{±1}n×d be n i.i.d. samples from P . Define the test statistic
T (X) =
d∑
i=1
(X¯2i − n) where X¯ =
n∑
j=1
Xj
The analysis of Canonne et al. shows that if P is the uniform distribution then E[T (X)] = 0,
while if P is a product distribution that is α-far from uniform then E[T (X)] ≥ 12α2n2. Moreover,
for some n = O(d1/2/α2), T (X) concentrates around its expectation well enough that we can
distinguish between these two cases.
The standard approach to obtaining a private tester is to add noise to the statistic T (X)
calibrated to its global sensitivity, which is defined as
GST = max
X∼X′
(T (X) − T (X ′))
where X ∼ X ′ denotes that X and X ′ are neighboring samples that differ on at most one sample.
To ensure privacy it is then sufficient to compute a noisy statistic T (X) + Z where Z is chosen
from an appropriate distribution (commonly, a Laplace distribution) with mean 0 and standard
deviation O(GST /ε). Thus, it is enough to add noise O(dn/ε). In order for the noise we add for
privacy not to overwhelm the signal of the tester, we then need dn/ε≪ α2n2, which requires us
to take n = Ω(d/α2ε), resulting in an undesirable linear dependence in d. In particular, this is
dominated in all parameter regimes by the sample-and-aggregate approach.
In view of the above, one way to find a better private tester would be to identify an alternative
statistic for testing uniformity of product distributions with lower global sensitivity. However,
we do not know of any other such test statistic that has asymptotically optimal non-private
sample complexity; a prerequisite to achieving optimal private sample complexity.
Intuition: Global Sensitivity vs. Average Sensitivity. Since we need privacy to hold
in the worst case for every dataset, any private algorithm for computing T must have error
proportional to GST on some dataset X. However, the utility of the tester only applies on
average to datasets drawn from product distributions. Thus, we can try to find some alternative
test statistic Tˆ that is close to T on average but has lower global sensitivity.
For simplicity, we will focus on constructing a test statistic Tˆ that agrees with T on average
over the uniform distribution U over {±1}d. Of course, this will not be enough for our purposes,
since we do not know that the data comes from the uniform distribution—if we did, we would
not need to run the tester at all. However, it will give a sense of the techniques that go into
our construction and why they lead to improved sample complexity. Handling the full range of
product distributions will require some additional steps, and will increase the sample complexity
beyond what is suggested by this sketch.
To this end, we can start by examining the sensitivity of T more closely. If we fix a pair of
neighboring samples X = (X1, . . . ,Xn) and X
′ = (X ′1, . . . ,Xn) then a calculation (see Section
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4.1) shows
T (X) − T (X ′) = 2(〈X1, X¯〉 − 〈X ′1, X¯ ′〉) . (4)
Looking at (4), we can upper bound the global sensitivity of T by applying the simple inequality
〈X1, X¯〉 ≤ ‖X1‖1‖X¯‖∞ ≤ dn .
This upper bound can indeed be tight in some cases, namely when Xj = (+1, . . . ,+1) for every
j and X ′1 = (−1, . . . ,−1). Yet, such datasets are extremely unlikely to arise under the uniform
distribution, and we can hope that the sensitivity of Tˆ can be much lower if it does not have to
agree with T on such datasets.
To get some intuition for why restricting to the uniform distribution helps, suppose that
X1, . . . ,Xn,X
′
1 are i.i.d. samples from U . Then it is not too difficult to show that the average
sensitivity is
AST,U = E
X1,...,Xn,X′1∼U
[|T (X)− T (X ′)|] = O(d+ (dn)1/2),
which is dramatically lower than the global sensitivity. If we could somehow add noise pro-
portional to AST,U then the noise would be only O((d + (dn)
1/2)/ε). To make the noise small
relative to the signal of the tester, it would suffice to take n = O(d1/2/αε1/2 + d1/3/α4/3ε2/3),
yielding a remarkable improvement over the previous attempts. Unfortunately, adding noise to
T proportional to AST,U is not enough to ensure differential privacy, but we can nonetheless use
this example as a guide towards finding a low-sensitivity test-statistic Tˆ .
Reducing the Sensitivity. The next step, which is novel to our work, is to observe that the
bound of 〈X1, X¯〉 ≤ ‖X1‖1‖X¯‖∞ is only tight when X1 and X¯ point in the same direction. But
for datasets that are drawn from the uniform distribution, the bound can be improved by using
the fact that X1,X
′
1, and X¯ are typically nearly orthogonal. That is, if X1, . . . ,Xn were drawn
from the uniform distribution, then with high probability we have
∀j = 1, . . . , n |〈Xj , X¯〉| ≤ ∆ = O˜(d+ (dn)1/2), (5)
Thus, if we could somehow restrict attention to datasets satisfying (5), we could significantly
reduce the sensitivity of Tˆ . However, our tester needs to be defined for all datasets, so it is not
a priori obvious how to use this fact to obtain a tester with low sensitivity. Nonetheless, we can
construct such a tester in two different ways, leading to different guarantees.
Lipschitz Extensions. The first method is to use the beautiful machinery of privacy via
Lipschitz extensions introduced by Blocki et al. [BBDS13] and Kasiviswanathan et al. [KNRS13]
in the context of node-differential-privacy for graph data. The idea here is simple: we know that
with high probability the dataset will fall in the set C∆ ⊆ {±1}n×d defined by
C∆ =
{
X ∈ {±1}n×d : ∀j = 1, . . . , n |〈Xj , X¯〉| ≤ ∆
}
for an appropriate value of ∆. We also know that the sensitivity when restricted to datasets in
C∆ is small, namely
RST,C∆ = max
X∼X′∈C∆
|T (X)− T (X ′)| ≤ 4∆.
In our case ∆ will correspond to (5), but will be slightly larger to accommodate distributions
that are not uniform yet are not “blatantly” non-uniform.
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What we need to compute is a Lipschitz extension of T . That is, a function Tˆ defined on all
of {±1}n×d such that: (1) Tˆ agrees with T on C∆, namely Tˆ (X) = T (X) for every X ∈ C∆. (2)
Tˆ has low global sensitivity, namely GSTˆ = RST,C∆ ≤ 4∆. Perhaps surprisingly, such a Lipschitz
extension exists for every real-valued function T and every subset of the domain C∆ [McS34]!
Once we have Tˆ , we can simply add noise to it proportional to O(∆/ε), and accuracy will
follow from the fact that, for datasets drawn from the uniform distribution, T (X) = Tˆ (X) with
high probability.
The drawback of this approach is that the function Tˆ is not necessarily efficiently computable,
and in general the only way to compute Tˆ may in the worst-case require enumerating over all
2nd datasets in {±1}n×d. We do not know any way to compute Tˆ efficiently, but we give a
simple, computationally efficient alternative with larger sample complexity.
Filtering. The second method is to filter out any sampleXj such that |〈Xj , X¯〉| > ∆ and replace
it with a fresh uniform element Xˆj of {±1}d, for which |〈Xˆj , X¯〉| ≤ ∆ with high probability.
However, because the data-dependent quantity X¯ affects the transformation of every sample,
the resulting algorithm might not have low global sensitivity. Specifically, changing one row of
the dataset might change many values of X¯, and thus change many rows of the filtered dataset.
We circumvent this problem by first computing a differentially private estimate X˜ ≈ X¯ , and
instead filtering out any sample Xj such that |〈Xj , X˜〉| > ∆′. This method is simple and compu-
tationally efficient. One can show that it indeed preserves differential privacy (see Section 4.2)
because, intuitively, it acts as a sort of Lipschitz extension from the set C∆′ . Unfortunately,
because of the noise introduced for privacy, our estimates of 〈Xj , X˜〉 are only accurate to within
O˜(d/ε), forcing us to choose ∆′ = ∆ + O˜(d/ε), which in turn increases the sensitivity, leading
to the bound in Theorem 1.3.
1.4 Related Work
Over the last couple decades, there has been significant work on hypothesis testing with a
focus on minimax rates. The starting point in the statistics community could be considered
the work of Ingster and coauthors [Ing94, Ing97, IS03]. Within theoretical computer science,
study on hypothesis testing arose as a subfield of property testing [GGR96, GR00]. Work by
Batu et al. [BFR+00, BFF+01] formalized several of the commonly studied problems, including
testing of uniformity, identity, closeness, and independence. Other representative works in this
line include [BKR04, Pan08, Val11, CDVV14, VV14, ADK15, BV15, DKN15, CDGR16, DK16,
Gol16, BCG17, DKW18]. Some works on testing in the multivariate setting include testing
of independence [BFF+01, AAK+07, RX14, LRR13, ADK15, DK16, CDKS18], and testing
on graphical models [CDKS17, DP17, DDK18, GLP18, ABDK18, BBC+19]. We note that
graphical models (both Ising models and Bayesian Networks) include the product distribution
case we study in this paper. Surveys and more thorough coverage of related work on minimax
hypothesis testing include [Rub12, Can15, Gol17, BW18, Kam18].
Early work on differentially private hypothesis testing began in the Statistics community
with [VS09, USF13], and there has more recently been a large body of work on this subject
primarily in the Computer Science community. Most relevant to this paper is the line of work
on minimax sample complexity of private hypothesis testing, initiated by Cai et al. [CDK17].
[ASZ18] and [ADR18] have given worst-case nearly optimal algorithms for goodness-of-fit and
closeness testing of arbitrary discrete distributions. Other recent works in this vein focus on
testing of simple hypotheses [CKM+18, CKM+19]. A paper of Awan and Slavkovic [AS18] gives
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a universally optimal test when the domain size is two, however Brenner and Nissim [BN14]
shows that such universally optimal tests cannot exist when the domain has more than two
elements. A line of work complementary to the minimax results [WLK15, GLRV16, KR17,
KSF17, CBRG18, SGHG+19, CKS+19] designs differentially private versions of popular test
statistics for testing goodness-of-fit, closeness, and independence, as well as private ANOVA,
focusing on the performance at small sample sizes. Work by Wang et al. [WKLK18] focuses on
generating statistical approximating distributions for differentially private statistics, which they
apply to hypothesis testing problems. There has also been work on hypothesis testing in the local
model of differential privacy, with a focus on both the minimax setting [DJW13, She18, ACFT19]
and the asymptotic setting [GR18].
Looking more broadly at private algorithms in statistical settings, there has recently been
significant study into estimation tasks. Some settings of interest include univariate discrete dis-
tributions [BNSV15, DHS15], Gaussians [KV18, KLSU19], and multivariate settings [KLSU19,
CWZ19]. Upper and lower bounds for learning the mean of a product distribution over the
hypercube in ℓ∞-distance include [BDMN05, BUV14, DMNS06, SU17]. [AKSZ18] designed
nearly optimal algorithms for estimating properties like support size and entropy. [Smi11] gives
an algorithm which allows one to estimate asymptotically normal statistics with minimal in-
crease in the sample complexity. In the local model, some works on distribution estimation
include [DJW13, WHW+16, KBR16, ASZ19, DR18, JKMW18, YB18, GRS19].
The Lipschitz-extension technique that we build upon was introduced in [BBDS13, KNRS13],
who also gave efficient Lipschitz extensions for graph statistics such as the edge density and the
number of triangles in sparse graphs. Later work constructed efficient Lipschitz extensions for
richer classes of graph statistics [RS16, SU19]. A closely related work of [CD18] introduced a
variant of the Lipschitz-extension machinery and showed how to construct efficient extensions
for statistics such as the median and trimmed mean. Recent results [BCSZ18b, BCSZ18a] prove
the existence of Lipschitz extensions for all differentially private algorithms, though efficiency is
not a focus.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Differential Privacy
Informally, differential privacy is a property that a randomized algorithm satisfies if its output
distribution does not change significantly under the change of a single data point.
Let S, S′ ∈ Sn be two datasets of the same size. We say that S, S′ are neighbors, denoted as
S ∼ S′, if they differ in at most one data point.
Definition 2.1 (Differential Privacy, [DMNS06]). A randomized algorithm A : Sn → O is (ε, δ)-
differentially private (DP) if for all neighboring datasets S, S′ and all measurable O ⊆ O,
Pr[A(S) ∈ O] ≤ eε Pr[A(S′) ∈ O] + δ.
Algorithm A is ε-differentially private if it satisfies the definition for δ = 0.
Differential privacy satisfies the following two useful properties.
Lemma 2.2 (Post-Processing, [DMNS06]). Let A : Sn → O be a randomized algorithm that
is (ε, δ)-differentially private. For every (possibly randomized) f : O → O′, f ◦ A is (ε, δ)-
differentially private.
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Lemma 2.3 (Composition, [DMNS06]). Let Mi : Sn → Oi be an (εi, δi)-differentially private
algorithm for i ∈ [k]. IfM[k] : Sn → O1× . . .×Ok is defined asM[k](S) = (M1(S), . . . ,Mk(S)),
then M[k] is (
∑k
i=1 εi,
∑k
i=1 δi)-differentially private.
A common technique that differentially private mechanisms use is to add zero-mean noise of
appropriate scale to the quantities computed from the dataset. The scale of the noise depends
on the sensitivity of the function of the dataset we aim to compute. Intuitively, the sensitivity
represents the maximum change that the change of a single data point can incur on the output
of the function.
Definition 2.4 (ℓ1- and ℓ2-sensitivity). Let f : Sn → Rk. The ℓ1-sensitivity of f is
∆1f = max
S,S′∈Sn
S∼S′
‖f(S)− f(S′)‖1.
Respectively, the ℓ2-sensitivity of f is ∆2f = max
S,S′∈Sn
S∼S′
‖f(S)− f(S′)‖2.
Two standard differentially private mechanisms, which are used very often as building blocks,
are the Laplace and the Gaussian Mechanism.
Lemma 2.5 (Laplace Mechanism, [DMNS06]). Let f : Sn → R, a dataset S ∈ Sn, and privacy
parameter ε. The Laplace Mechanism
f˜(S) = f(S) + Lap(∆1f/ε)
is ε-differentially private and with probability at least 1− γ, |f˜(S)− f(S)| ≤ ∆1fε ln 1γ .
Lemma 2.6 (Gaussian Mechanism, [DKM+06]). Let f : Sn → Rd, a dataset S ∈ Sn, and
privacy parameters (ε, δ). The Gaussian Mechanism
f˜(S) = f(S) +N (0, σ2Id×d), where σ = ∆2f
√
2 ln(5/4δ)/ε
is (ε, δ)-differentially private and with probability at least 1− γ, ‖f˜(S)− f(S)‖2 ≤ 4σ
√
d ln 1γ .
2.2 Useful Facts on Distances Between Multivariate Distributions
We here record some lemmata which will be useful to us, relating total variation distance
(equivalently, L1) between the multivariate distributions we consider to the ℓ2 distances between
their mean vectors.
The first is relatively standard; for the specific constants stated below, it is a direct conse-
quence of [DMR18, Theorem 1.2].
Fact 2.7. Let µ, ν ∈ Rd. Then, the L1 distance between the two multivariate Normal distribu-
tions N (µ, Id×d), N (ν, Id×d) satisfies
1
100
· ‖µ− ν‖2 ≤ ‖N (µ, Id×d)−N (ν, Id×d)‖1 ≤ 9 · ‖µ− ν‖2 .
The second relates, similarly, L1 distance between product distributions over {±1}d to the ℓ2
distance between their means, however with a caveat – namely, at least one of the distributions
needs to be “balanced,” i.e., have all its marginals “not-nearly constant.”
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Lemma 2.8. Fix τ ∈ (0, 1], and let P,Q be product distributions over {±1}d with mean vectors
µ, ν ∈ [−1, 1]d such that −1 + τ ≤ νi ≤ 1− τ for all i. Then, the L1 distance between P and Q
satisfies
cτ · ‖µ− ν‖2 ≤ ‖P −Q‖1 ≤ Cτ · ‖µ − ν‖2 ,
where Cτ , cτ > 0 are two constants depending only on τ . Moreover, one can take Cτ =
1/
√
τ(1− τ2 ).
Proof. The upper bound follows from [CDKS17, Corollary 3.5] (note that their parameterization
is for P,Q over {0, 1}d). As for the lower bound, it is proven analogously to [KLSU19, Lemma
6.4]; with two main differences. First, their lemma is stated for τ = 2/3, whereas we allow
it to be an arbitrarily small constant – the same argument carries through, albeit at the cost
of larger constant factors in the bound. Second, their lemma requires that both P and Q be
balanced, whereas we only require one to be balanced. This can be dealt with by noting that if
one distribution is not balanced in some coordinate, the difference in means in this coordinate
is sufficient to witness a large total variation distance.
3 From Gaussian to Product-of-Bernoulli Testing
In this short section, we provide a simple argument which enables us to transfer all our results
on uniformity testing for product-of-Bernoulli distributions (described next, in Section 4) to
testing identity of multivariate Normal distributions. Specifically, we analyze a simple reduction
which maps a sample from an unknown multivariate normal N (µ, Id×d) to a sample from a
product distribution Pµ on {±1}d, such that the standard Normal N (0, Id×d) is mapped to
P0 = Ud, while any Normal α-far from N (0, Id×d) is mapped to some Pµ that is Ω(α)-far from
Ud.
Theorem 3.1. There exists a function F : Rd → {±1}d and an absolute constant c > 0 such
that the following holds. For µ ∈ Rd, denote by Pµ the distribution of F (X) when X is drawn
from N (µ, Id×d). Then
• If µ = 0, then P0 = Ud is the uniform distribution on {±1}d;
• Pµ is a product distribution over {±1}d such that ‖Pµ−Ud‖1 ≥ c·‖N (µ, Id×d)−N (0, Id×d)‖1.
Moreover, F is computable in linear time.
Before providing the proof of the theorem, we note that, with this reduction, Theorems 1.1
and 1.2 directly follow from their respective counterparts, Theorems 1.3 and 1.4.
Proof. The mapping F : Rd → {±1}d is defined coordinate-wise, by setting F (x)i := sgn(xi) for
all i ∈ [d]; thus trivially implying the first item, as well as the time-efficiency statement and the
fact that Pµ is a product distribution. We turn to the remaining part of the second item. Fix
any µ ∈ Rd, and define for convenience α := ‖N (µ, Id×d)−N (0, Id×d)‖1 ∈ [0, 2]; by Fact 2.7, we
have ‖µ‖2 ≥ α9 . For every i ∈ [d],
E
X∼N (µ,Id×d)
[F (X)i] = 2P[F (X)i = 1]−1 = 2P[Xi > 0]−1 = Erfc(−µi/
√
2)−1 = −Erf(−µi/
√
2) .
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Therefore, the mean vector µ′ of Pµ satisfies
‖µ′‖22 =
d∑
i=1
Erf(−µi/
√
2)2 ≥ 0.842
d∑
i=1
min(µ2i /2, 1) = 0.84
2min(‖µ‖22/2, d) ≥ 0.842α2/162 ,
the first inequality by Lemma 3.2 (which we will prove momentarily) and the last by our above
lower bound on ‖µ‖2. This shows that ‖µ′‖2 > α/12. Applying finally Lemma 2.8 (with Q = Ud,
for which τ = 1), we get existence of an absolute constant c > 0 such that ‖Pµ − Ud‖1 ≥ cα, as
sought.
The above argument relied on a technical lemma about the error function Erf, which we state
and prove below.
Lemma 3.2. For all t ∈ R, |Erf(−t)| ≥ 0.84 ·min{|t|, 1}.
Proof. Consider the functions g(t) = (Erf(−t))2 and f(t) = g(t)
t2
for t > 0. It holds that
g′(t) = 2Erf(−t) · (Erf(−t))′ = − 4√
π
exp(−t2)Erf(−t). (6)
So g(t) is increasing in (0,∞), since g′(t) > 0. Then, for t > 1, g(t) > g(1) = (Erf(−1))2 > 0.842.
Thus,
|Erf(−t)| > 0.84 ∀t > 1. (7)
Now consider the function f(t) in (0,∞).
f ′(t) =
g′(t)
t2
− 2g(t)
t3
= − 4√
πt2
exp(−t2)Erf(−t)− 2
t3
(Erf(−t))2 (by (6))
= −4 exp(−t
2)Erf(−t)√
πt3
(
t− exp(t2)
∫ t
0
exp(−x2) dx
)
(since −t < 0)
Let us denote h(t) = t− exp(t2) ∫ t0 exp(−x2) dx for t ∈ [0,∞). It holds that
h′(t) = 1− (exp(t2))′ ∫ t
0
exp(−x2) dx− exp(t2) exp(−t2) = −2t exp(t2)
∫ t
0
exp(−x2) dx ≤ 0.
So h(t) is decreasing in [0,∞) and h(t) < h(0) = 0 for t > 0. It follows that f ′(t) < 0, so f(t) is
decreasing in (0,∞). Thus, for t ∈ (0, 1], f(t) ≥ f(1) = 0.842. Equivalently,
|Erf(−t)| ≥ 0.84|t| ∀t ∈ (0, 1]. (8)
By inequalities (7) and (8), we conclude that |Erf(−t)| ≥ 0.84 · min{|t|, 1} for t > 0 and the
claim follows by symmetry.
4 Uniformity Testing for Product-of-Bernoulli Distributions
In this section we introduce our algorithms for uniformity testing. Both algorithms use a
noisy version of the test statistic for uniformity testing introduced in [CDKS17]:
T (X) =
d∑
i=1
(X¯2i − n). (9)
The tests differ in the way that they reduce the sensitivity of the test statistic, giving tradeoffs
between sample complexity and computational complexity.
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4.1 A Computationally Inefficient Private Algorithm
In this section we focus on a computationally inefficient algorithm for uniformity testing
based on Lipschitz extensions. Specifically, we identify a subset set of datasets for which the
sensitivity of T on these datasets is low and we compute a test statistic Tˆ that agrees with T on
this subset, but has low sensitivity on all datasets. The existence of such a Lipschitz extension is
guaranteed by the McShane-Whitney extension theorem [McS34]; however, the construction of
Lipschitz extensions is not efficient in general. In the next section, where we focus on the efficient
construction, we will replace the Lipschitz extension by an efficient algorithm that attempts to
achieve a similar objective.
Let P = P1 × · · · × Pd be a product distribution over {±1}d, which is specified by its mean
vector p = (p1, · · · , pd) ∈ [−1, 1]d. We will denote the product of d independent copies of
the uniform distribution by Ud. We draw samples from distribution P and aim to distinguish
between the cases P = Ud and ‖P − Ud‖1 ≥ α with probability at least 2/3.
Algorithm 1 Private Uniformity Testing via Lipschitz Extension
Require: Sample X = (X(1), . . . ,X(n)) ∈ {±1}n×d drawn from Pn. Parameters ε, α,∆1/50 > 0.
Stage 1: Pre-processing
1: Let X¯ ←∑nj=1X(j).
2: Let r1 ∼ Lap(2/ε) and z1 ← maxi∈[d] |X¯i|+ r1.
3: if z1 >
√
2n ln(50d) + 8/ε then return REJECT.
Stage 2: Lipschitz extension
4: Define the set C = {X ∈ {±1}n×d ∣∣ ∀j ∈ [n] |〈X(j), X¯〉| ≤ ∆1/50}.
5: Let Tˆ (·) be a 4∆1/50-Lipschitz extension of T from C to all of {±1}n×d.
Stage 3: Noise Addition and thresholding
6: Let r2 ∼ Lap(4∆1/50/ε) and z2 ← Tˆ (X) + r2.
7: if z2 >
1
4n(n− 1)α2 then return REJECT
8: return ACCEPT.
The main theorem of this section is the following:
Theorem 4.1. Given any choice of ∆1/50, Algorithm 1 is 2ε-differentially private. Furthermore,
for an appropriate choice of parameter ∆1/50, Algorithm 1 can distinguish between the cases
P = Ud and ‖P − Ud‖1 ≥ α with probability at least 2/3 and has sample complexity
n = O˜
(
d1/2
α2
+
d1/2
αε1/2
+
d1/3
α2/3ε
+
d1/4
αε
)
.
Our test is a private adaptation of the test from [CDKS17]. First let us recall the guarantees
of the test statistic T developed in [CDKS17]. In their work, Canonne et al. use Poisson
sampling; however the interplay between privacy (which is defined with regard to a fixed set of
samples) and Poisson sampling (where the number of samples is itself randomized) is tricky at
best. For this reason, we state a version of their result without Poisson sampling.
Lemma 4.2 (Non-private Test Guarantees). For the test T defined in (9), the following hold:
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• If P = Ud then E[T (X)] = 0 and Var(T (X)) ≤ 2n2d.
• If ‖P − Ud‖1 ≥ α then E[T (X)] > 12n(n− 1)α2.
• Var(T (X)) ≤ 2n2d+ 4nE[T (X)].
Proof. Note that, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ d, ∑nj=1X(j)1 = 2Yi − n where Yi is Binomially distributed
with parameters n and 1+pi2 , and Y1, . . . , Yd are independent. Therefore, we have
T (X) =
d∑
i=1
(
(2Yi − n)2 − n
)
=
d∑
i=1
(
4Y 2i − 4nYi + n(n− 1)
)
and a simple computation yields E[T (X)] = n(n − 1)∑di=1 p2i = n(n− 1)‖p‖22. If P = Ud, then
this directly implies E[T (X)] = 0; moreover, if ‖P−Ud‖1 ≥ α, then ‖p‖22 ≥ α2/2 (by Lemma 2.8).
Thus, this establishes the claimed bounds on the expectation of the statistic.
Turning to the variance, assume first that P = Ud, i.e., ‖p‖2 = 0. In this case,
Var(T (X)) =
d∑
i=1
Var
(
(2Yi − n)2 − n
)
=
d∑
i=1
E[((2Yi − n)2 − n)2] = 2n(n − 1)d,
expanding the square and using the expression for the first to fourth moments of a Bin(n, 1/2)
random variable. For general P , one can compute explicitly this quantity, to obtain
Var(T (X)) = 2n(n − 1)
d∑
i=1
(1 + (2n− 4)p2i − (2n − 3)p4i )
≤ 2n(n − 1)d + 4n(n− 1)(n − 2)
d∑
i=1
p2i
≤ 2n(n − 1)d + 4nE[T (X)].
We first focus on the privacy guarantee of Theorem 4.1. The mechanism is the composition
of two invocations of the Laplacian mechanism in line 2 and line 6. Our privacy proof is based
on the existence of Lipschitz extensions, as established by the following theorem.
Lemma 4.3 (McShane–Whitney extension theorem, [McS34]). Let ϕ : C → R be a real-valued,
L-Lipschitz function defined on a subset C of a metric spaceM. Then, there exists an L-Lipschitz
map ϕˆ :M→ R that extends ϕ, that is, ϕ(x) = ϕˆ(x) ∀x ∈ C.
In this work, we will invoke the the McShane–Whitney extension theorem with the metric
space M being the space of databases with the metric induced by the neighboring relation.
The main element that we need for the privacy proof is the bound on the sensitivity of T
on C. This would ensure that T is 4∆1/50-Lipschitz on C, so the (4∆1/50)-Lipschitz extension Tˆ
exists and line 6 adds enough noise to maintain privacy. Note that, while the algorithm will be
private regardless of the value of ∆1/50, in order to ensure accuracy, we will choose it so that
probability of a dataset falling into the corresponding set C is sufficiently high.
Lemma 4.4 (Sensitivity of T). For two neighboring datasets X,X ′ ∈ C, |T (X) − T (X ′)| ≤
4∆1/50.
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Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that X and X ′ differ on the n-th sample. Then, we can
write X = (X(1), . . . ,X(n)) and X ′ = (X(1), . . . ,X ′(n)). We can now calculate the difference:
T (X)− T (X ′) =
d∑
i=1
 n∑
j=1
X
(j)
i
2 −
 n∑
j=1
X
′(j)
i
2
=
d∑
i=1
 n∑
j=1
X
(j)
i −
n∑
j=1
X
′(j)
i
 ·
 n∑
j=1
X
(j)
i +
n∑
j=1
X
′(j)
i

=
d∑
i=1
(X(n)i −X ′(n)i ) ·
 n∑
j=1
X
(j)
i +
n∑
j=1
X
′(j)
i

=
d∑
i=1
X(n)i ·
2 n∑
j=1
X
(j)
i +X
′(n)
i −X(n)i
−X ′(n)i ·
2 n∑
j=1
X
′(j)
i +X
(n)
i −X ′(n)i

= 2〈X(n), X¯〉 − 2〈X ′(n), X¯ ′〉+
d∑
i=1
(X
(n)
i +X
′(n)
i ) · (X ′(n)i −X(n)i )
Therefore, we have
T (X)− T (X ′) = 2〈X(n), X¯〉 − 2〈X ′(n), X¯ ′〉+ ‖X ′(n)‖22 − ‖X(n)‖22. (10)
Observe that, because X
(n)
i ,X
′(n)
i are in {±1}, we will have ‖X ′(n)‖22 = ‖X(n)‖22 = d, leading to
T (X) − T (X ′) ≤ 2(〈X(n), X¯〉 − 〈X ′(n), X¯ ′〉) , as stated earlier, in (4). This readily implies the
bound
|T (X)− T (X ′)| ≤ 2|〈X(n), X¯〉|+ 2|〈X ′(n), X¯ ′〉|.
Since X,X ′ ∈ C, we know that ∣∣〈X(n), X¯〉∣∣ ≤ ∆1/50 and ∣∣〈X ′(n), X¯ ′〉∣∣ ≤ ∆1/50. It follows that
|T (X)− T (X ′)| ≤ 4∆1/50.
Lemma 4.5 (Privacy). Algorithm 1 is 2ε-differentially private.
Proof. Algorithm 1 is a composition of two invocations of the Laplacian Mechanism, in step 2
and step 6. By Lemma 2.5, both steps are individually ε-differentially private. Since these are
the only steps that access the data, the privacy guarantee follows from Lemmas 2.3 and 2.2.
We now turn to the utility guarantee of Theorem 4.1. The crux of the proof can be sum-
marised as follows:
1. If P = Ud, then with high probability X passes the first check at line 3.
2. We can choose ∆1/50 such that:
(a) If X passes line 3 then it belongs in C with high probability, so T (X) = Tˆ (X).
(b) The amount of noise added to Tˆ (X) is small enough that one can still distinguish
between the two hypotheses.
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We start by proving that if P = Ud, then with high probability X is not rejected at line 3. Since
we are allowed to fail with probability 1/3, each step of the algorithm is allowed to fail with
constant probability. We will prove a slightly more general statement than we need, where we
keep track of the failure probability, because these more general statements will be useful in
the following section. In the remainder of this section, one can think of setting β to be a small
constant, say 1/50.
Lemma 4.6. With probability at least 1− 3β, if P = Ud then z1 ≤
√
2n ln dβ +
2
ε ln
1
β .
Proof. If P = Ud then E[X¯i] = 0, ∀i ∈ [d]. Each X¯i is a sum of n independent random variables
in [−1, 1], therefore, by Hoeffding ’s inequality, it holds that
Pr[|X¯i| ≥ t] ≤ 2 exp(−2t2/4n).
For t =
√
2n ln dβ ,
Pr
[
|X¯i| ≥
√
2n ln
d
β
]
≤ 2β
d
.
Therefore, by a union bound, with probability at least 1− 2β, |X¯i| ≤
√
2n ln(d/β) holds for all
i ∈ [d]. By Lemma 2.5, it holds that with probability 1 − β, |r1| ≤ 2ε ln 1β . We conclude that if
P = Ud, then with probability 1− 3β,
z1 = max
i∈[d]
|Xi|+ r1 ≤
√
2n ln
d
β
+
2
ε
ln
1
β
.
Lemma 4.7. Let X be a dataset that passes line 3 of Algorithm 1. With probability 1− 5β, for
all x ∈ X,
|〈x, X¯〉| ≤ 25
(
d ln
d
β
+
d
ε2n
ln2
1
β
+
√
nd
√
ln
d
β
· ln n
β
+
√
d
ε
√
ln
n
β
ln
1
β
)
.
Proof. For all k ∈ [n], it holds that
|〈X(k), X¯〉| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
d∑
i=1
X(k)i · n∑
j=1
X
(j)
i
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ‖X(k)‖22 +
∣∣∣∣∣∣
d∑
i=1
X(k)i ·∑
j 6=k
X
(j)
i
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (11)
For all k ∈ [n], ‖X(k)‖22 = d, so we focus on the second term. Let r1 ∼ Lap(2/ε) as in step 3
of Algorithm 1. By Lemma 2.5, with probability at least 1 − β, |r1| ≤ 2ε ln 1β . Therefore, if a
dataset X passes step 3 of Algorithm 1, then with probability 1− β for all i ∈ [d] it holds that∣∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
j=1
X
(j)
i
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
√
2n ln
d
β
+
2
ε
ln
1
β
+ |r1| ≤
√
2n ln
d
β
+
4
ε
ln
1
β
. (12)
Since |X(k)i | ≤ 1 for all k ∈ [n], it also holds that, for all i ∈ [d] and all k ∈ [n],∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j 6=k
X
(j)
i
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
j=1
X
(j)
i
∣∣∣∣∣∣+ 1 ≤ 2
√
n ln
d
β
+
4
ε
ln
1
β
. (13)
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The samples are drawn independently, therefore E
[
X
(k)
i
]
= 1nE
[∑n
j=1X
(j)
i
]
for all i ∈ [d] and all
k ∈ [n]. By (12) and Hoeffding’s inequality, it follows that with probability 1−β− 2β = 1− 3β,
for all i ∈ [d] and all k ∈ [n],∣∣∣∣∣∣E
 n∑
j=1
X
(j)
i
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
√
2n ln
d
β
+
4
ε
ln
1
β
+
√
2n ln
d
β
= 2
√
2n ln
d
β
+
4
ε
ln
1
β
.
The latter also implies that with probability 1− 3β, since |X(k)i | ≤ 1, the next two inequalities
hold for all i ∈ [d] and for all k ∈ [n].
∣∣∣E[X(k)i ]∣∣∣ = 1n
∣∣∣∣∣∣E
 n∑
j=1
X
(j)
i
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2
√
2
n
ln
d
β
+
4
nε
ln
1
β
(14)
∣∣∣E[∑
j 6=k
X
(j)
i
]∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣E
 n∑
j=1
X
(j)
i
∣∣∣∣∣∣+ 1 ≤ 2
√
2n ln
d
β
+
4
ε
ln
1
β
+ 1 ≤ 4
√
n ln
d
β
+
4
ε
ln
1
β
(15)
The samples are independent, so by inequalities (14) and (15),
∣∣∣E[X(k)i ·∑
j 6=k
X
(j)
i
]∣∣∣ ≤ (4√n ln d
β
+
4
ε
ln
1
β
)(
2
√
2
n
ln
d
β
+
4
nε
ln
1
β
)
≤ 24
(
ln
d
β
+
1
nε2
ln2
1
β
)
.
Therefore, with probability at least 1− 3β, for all k ∈ [n],
∣∣∣E[ d∑
i=1
(
X
(k)
i ·
∑
j 6=k
X
(j)
i
)]∣∣∣ ≤ d∑
i=1
∣∣∣E[X(k)i ·∑
j 6=k
X
(j)
i
]∣∣∣ ≤ 24(d ln d
β
+
d
nε2
ln2
1
β
)
. (16)
By inequality (13), with probability at least 1− 3β, it holds that
∣∣∣X(k)i ·∑
j 6=k
X
(j)
i
∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∑
j 6=k
X
(j)
i
∣∣∣ ≤ 2√n ln d
β
+
4
ε
ln
1
β
.
Using this bound, Hoeffding’s inequality and a union bound, it follows that with probability
1− 3β − 2n exp
− 2t2
4d
(
2
√
n ln dβ +
4
ε ln
1
β
)2
,
for all k ∈ [n] it simultaneously holds that
∣∣∣ d∑
i=1
(
X
(k)
i ·
∑
j 6=k
X
(j)
i
)∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣E[ d∑
i=1
(
X
(k)
i ·
∑
j 6=k
X
(j)
i
)]∣∣∣+ t.
16
Setting t =
(
2
√
n ln dβ +
4
ε ln
1
β
)√
2d ln nβ and by inequality (16), we have that with probability
1− 3β − 2β = 1− 5β, for all k ∈ [n],∣∣∣ d∑
i=1
(
X
(k)
i ·
∑
j 6=k
X
(j)
i
)∣∣∣ ≤ 24(d ln d
β
+
d
nε2
ln2
1
β
+
√
nd
√
ln
d
β
· ln n
β
+
√
d
ε
√
ln
n
β
ln
1
β
)
Thus, by inequality (11), we are done.
Setting β = 1/50 in Lemma 4.6, we have established the first part of our proof outline, that
if P = Ud then with high probability X is not rejected at line 3. Setting β = 150 in Lemma 4.7
and
∆1/50 = 25
(
d ln(50d) +
d
nε2
ln2 50 +
√
nd
√
ln(50d) ln(50n) +
√
d
ε
ln(50)
√
ln(50n)
)
, (17)
we have established the second part of our proof outline, that if X survives line 3 then with high
probability X ∈ C, so Tˆ (X) = T (X). The main aspect remaining is to show that the amount
of noise added to Tˆ (X) is small enough to still distinguish between P = Ud and ‖P − Ud‖1 ≥ α
with constant probability.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. The privacy guarantee was established in Lemma 4.5. It remains to prove
that if P = Ud then Algorithm 1 outputs ACCEPT with probability at least 2/3 (completeness)
and that if ‖P − Ud‖1 ≥ α then Algorithm 1 outputs REJECT with probability at least 2/3
(soundness).
Completeness: By Lemma 4.6, with probability 1−3β, if P = Ud then we don’t REJECT in line 3
and continue to line 8.
If we choose ∆1/50 as in equation (17), then by Lemma 4.7 and union bound, with probability
1−3β−5β = 1−8β, X passes line 3 and X ∈ C, so Tˆ (X) = T (X). What remains to show is that
with high probability, z2 ≤ 14n(n − 1)α2. Let r2 ∼ Lap
(
4∆1/50/ε
)
as in line 8 of Algorithm 1.
By Lemma 2.5, it holds that with probability at least 0.95, |r2| ≤ 4∆1/50 ln(20)ε . It follows that
with probability at least 0.95 − 8β, Tˆ (X) = T (X) and |r2| ≤ 4∆1/50 ln(20)ε hold. Setting
n = Ω
(
d1/2
αε1/2
(ln d)1/2 +
d1/3
α2/3ε
+
d1/3
α4/3ε2/3
(
(ln d) ln
d
αε
)1/3
+
d1/4
αε
(
ln
d
αε
)1/4)
, (18)
we have |r2| ≤ 4∆1/50 ln(20)ε ≤ n(n−1)α
2
8 . Then, with probability 0.95− 8β,
Pr
[
z2 >
n(n− 1)α2
4
]
= Pr
[
T (X) >
n(n− 1)α2
4
− r2
]
(Tˆ (X) = T (X))
≤ Pr
[
T (X) >
n(n− 1)α2
8
]
(|r2| ≤ n(n−1)α
2
8 )
= Pr
[
T (X) >
n(n− 1)α2
8
+ E[T (X)]
]
(Lemma 4.2)
≤ Var(T (X))
(n(n− 1)α2/8)2 (Chebyshev’s inequality)
≤ 128d
(n− 1)2α4 (Lemma 4.2)
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For n = Ω
(
d1/2
α2
)
, it holds that Pr
[
z2 ≥ n(n−1)α
2
4
]
≤ 0.05. Therefore, with probability 0.9 − 8β,
z2 ≤ n(n−1)α
2
4 holds and Algorithm 1 does not reject in line 8 either.
We conclude that if n = Ω
(
d1/2
α2
)
and it satisfies equation (18) at the same time, then with
probability at least 0.9− 8/50 > 2/3 Algorithm 1 outputs ACCEPT.
Soundness: Let us assume that the algorithm does not return REJECT in line 3, which is the
desired output in this case. Similar to the completeness proof, for the chosen n of equation (18),
with probability at least 0.95 − 5β, |r2| ≤ n(n−1)α
2
8 and the dataset X, which passes line 3,
satisfies X ∈ C so Tˆ (X) = T (X). Then,
Pr
[
z2 ≤ n(n− 1)α
2
4
]
= Pr
[
T (X) ≤ n(n− 1)α
2
4
− r2
]
(Tˆ (X) = T (X))
≤ Pr
[
T (X) ≤ 3n(n− 1)α
2
8
]
(|r2| ≤ n(n−1)α
2
8 )
≤ Pr
[
T (X) ≤ 3E[T (X)]
4
]
(Lemma 4.2)
= Pr
[
E[T (X)]− T (X) ≥ 1
4
E[T (X)]
]
≤ 4
2 · Var(T (X))
(E[T (X)])2
(Chebyshev’s inequality)
≤ 64d
(n− 1)2α4 +
128
(n− 1)α2 (Lemma 4.2)
For n = Ω
(
d1/2
α2
)
, it holds that Pr
[
z2 ≤ n(n−1)α
2
4
]
≤ 0.05. So, with probability at least
0.9−5β = 0.9−5/50 > 2/3, Algorithm 1 will output REJECT in step 8. Therefore, the algorithm
will output REJECT with overall probability at least 2/3.
We conclude that if
n = Ω
(
d1/2
α2
+
d1/2
αε1/2
(ln d)1/2 +
d1/3
α2/3ε
+
d1/3
α4/3ε2/3
(
(ln d) ln
d
αε
)1/3
+
d1/4
αε
(
ln
d
αε
)1/4)
(19)
then Algorithm 1 can distinguish between the cases P = Ud and ‖P −Ud‖1 ≥ α with probability
at least 2/3. The final sample complexity guarantee follows by observing that (up to polylog-
arithmic factors) one of these terms can never dominate the asymptotic sample complexity. It
remains to show the equivalence of the sample complexity obtained in (19) and that of the
theorem statement which we do next.
Claim 4.8. For any choice of parameters d, α, ε, d
1/3
α4/3ε2/3
≤ max
{
d1/2
α2
, d
1/4
αε
}
.
Proof. Let us assume that d
1/3
α4/3ε2/3
> max
{
d1/2
α2 ,
d1/4
αε
}
. Then d
1/3
α4/3ε2/3
> 13 · d
1/2
α2 +
2
3 · d
1/4
αε . By the
AM-GM inequality, it holds that
1
3
· d
1/2
α2
+
2
3
· d
1/4
αε
≥ d
1/6
α2/3
· d
2/12
α2/3ε2/3
=
d1/3
α4/3ε2/3
,
which leads to a contradiction. Therefore, it must be that d
1/3
α4/3ε2/3
≤ max
{
d1/2
α2 ,
d1/4
αε
}
.
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This concludes the proof of Theorem 4.1.
4.2 A Computationally Efficient Private Algorithm
We next turn our attention to the computationally efficient algorithm, Algorithm 2. Notice
that Algorithm 2 almost matches Algorithm 1 for the first three lines and the last two lines,
so the main focus in this section will be a computationally efficient analogue of the Lipschitz
extension step in Algorithm 1. By Lemma 4.6 and Lemma 4.7, with high probability if P = Ud
we have ∀j ∈ [n],
|〈X(j), X¯〉| ≤ ∆δ, (20)
which is almost exactly the condition we put on the set C. Thus, if any data point in X does not
satisfy the inner product condition in (20), we can REJECT the dataset. Algorithm 2 proceeds
by first attempting to verify membership in C by privately counting the number of datapoints
that violate condition (20) when compared to a private version of X¯ , called X˜. We reject if
the private test determines with high probability that there is a non-zero number of such points
(lines 4-7). If X survives this step then Algorithm 2 attempts to ensure that X ∈ C by replacing
data points that don’t satisfy (20) (again compared to a noisy X¯) with draws from the uniform
distribution (steps 8-12). Since X was already close to C, not many data points are changed so
the resulting dataset, Xˆ , still looks like X but has bounded inner products with high probability.
The Lipschitz extension Tˆ (X) is thus replaced with T (Xˆ) and the remainder of the algorithm
proceeds as in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 2 has a higher sample complexity than Algorithm 1. This arises in two places.
Firstly, |〈X(j), X¯〉| can be an additive factor of d log(1/δ)/ε larger than |〈X(j), X˜〉|, which is
the quantity we actually test. Also, when counting the number of points that violate condition
(20), we incur an error of order d log(1/δ)/ε again, which means that X and Xˆ may be more
different than we expect. This results in a
√
d log(1/δ)/εα term that was not present in the
sample complexity of the inefficient algorithm.
Unlike Algorithm 1, which satisfied pure differential privacy, Algorithm 2 as written will
only satisfy approximate differential privacy. The δ term arises since there is a small proba-
bility that the projection Xˆ could fail to be in C, in which case the amount of noise added to
T (Xˆ) is insufficient for privacy. However, for hypothesis tests with constant error probabili-
ties, sample complexity bounds for differential privacy are equivalent, up to constant factors, to
sample complexity bounds for other notions of distributional algorithmic stability, such as (ε, δ)-
DP [DKM+06], concentrated DP [DR16, BS16], KL- and TV-stability [WLF16, BNS+16] (see
[ASZ18, Lemma 5]). The transformation of a test from (ε, δ)-DP to O(ε)-DP given in [ASZ18]
is efficient so Algorithm 2 implies the existence of an efficient pure DP with the same sample
complexity up to constant factors.
Theorem 4.9. Algorithm 2 is (4ε, 17δ)-differentially private and distinguishes between the cases
P = Ud versus ‖P − Ud‖1 ≥ α with probability at least 2/3, having sample complexity
n = O˜
(
d1/2
α2
+
d1/2
αε
)
.
We will focus first on proving that Algorithm 2 is (4ε, 17δ)-differentially private. The majority
of the work in the proof will involve showing that with high probability Xˆ satisfies a property
similar to equation (20). Since this relies on previous steps, the privacy proof is not simply an
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Algorithm 2 Efficient Private Uniformity Testing
Require: Sample X = (X(1), . . . ,X(n)) ∈ {±1}n×d drawn from Pn. Parameters ε, δ, α > 0.
1: Let X¯ ←∑nj=1X(j).
Stage 1: Pre-processing
2: Let r1 ∼ Lap(2/ε) and z1 ← maxi∈[d] |X¯i|+ r1.
3: if z1 >
√
2n ln dδ +
2
ε ln
1
δ then return REJECT.
4: Let X˜ ← X¯ +R, where R ∼ N (0, σ2Id×d) and σ =
√
8d ln(5/4δ)
ε .
5: Let ∆δ ← 25
(
d ln dδ +
d
nε2
ln2 1δ +
√
nd
√
ln dδ · ln nδ +
√
d
ε ln
1
δ
√
ln nδ
)
.
6: Let r2 ∼ Lap(1/ε) and z2 ← |{j ∈ [n] : |〈X(j), X˜〉| > ∆δ + 4dε
√
ln 54δ · ln nδ }|+ r2.
7: if z2 >
ln(1/δ)
ε then return REJECT.
Stage 2: Filtering
8: for j = 1, . . . , n do
9: if |〈X(j), X˜〉| > ∆δ + 4dε
√
ln 54δ · ln nδ then
10: Xˆ(j) ← U (j) where U (j) ∼ Ud
11: else
12: Xˆ(j) ← X(j)
Stage 3: Noise addition and thresholding
13: Let r3 ∼ Lap
((
4∆δ +
48d
ε
√
ln 54δ · ln nδ
)
/ε
)
and z3 ← T (Xˆ) + r3.
14: if z3 >
1
4n(n− 1)α2 then return REJECT
15: return ACCEPT.
application of the composition theorem for differential privacy. We first show that lines 8-12,
which replace elements of X with draws from the uniform distribution, results in new elements
that satisfy (20). This follows directly from Lemma 4.7.
Lemma 4.10. Let X be a dataset that passes line 3 of Algorithm 2. Suppose U (j) ∼ Ud for
j ∈ [n]. Then with probability 1− 5δ, for all j ∈ [n],∣∣∣〈U (j), X¯〉∣∣∣ ≤ ∆δ.
Lemma 4.11. Let X be a dataset that passes line 3 and line 7 of Algorithm 2. Then with
probability 1− 8δ, it holds that, for every point x ∈ Xˆ,
|〈x, ¯ˆX〉| ≤ ∆δ + 12d
ε
√
ln
5
4δ
· ln n
δ
. (21)
Proof. Since X passed step 7 and by Lemma 2.5, with probability 1− δ,∣∣∣∣∣
{
j ∈ [n] : |〈X(j), X˜〉| > ∆δ + 4d
ε
√
ln
5
4δ
· ln n
δ
}∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2ε ln 1δ .
Therefore, X and Xˆ differ in at most 2ε ln
1
δ data points, so for every x ∈ Xˆ,
|〈x, ¯ˆX〉| ≤ |〈x, X¯〉|+ |〈x, X¯ − ¯ˆX〉| ≤ |〈x, X¯〉|+ 2d · 2
ε
ln
1
δ
= |〈x, X¯〉|+ 4d
ε
ln
1
δ
. (22)
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For any x that was resampled during line 10, that is, x = U (j) for some j ∈ [n], by Lemma 4.10,
we are done. Otherwise, if x was not resampled then by assumption |〈x, X˜〉| ≤ ∆δ+4dε
√
ln 54δ · ln nδ
and
|〈x, X¯〉| ≤ |〈x, X˜〉|+ |〈x, X¯ − X˜〉| ≤ ∆δ + 4d
ε
√
ln
5
4δ
· ln n
δ
+ |〈x, X¯ − X˜〉|. (23)
Now, X¯ − X˜ = R where R ∼ N (0, σ2Id×d) and σ =
√
8d ln(5/4δ)/ε. By symmetry,
〈x, X¯ − X˜〉 = 〈1, R〉 =
d∑
i=1
Yi,
where each Yi ∼ N (0, σ2). Thus, with probability 1− 2δ, for all x ∈ X,
|〈x, X¯ − X˜〉| ≤ 4d
ε
√
ln
5
4δ
· ln n
δ
. (24)
Therefore, with probability 1− 8δ, by inequalities (22) and (23), ∀x ∈ Xˆ,
|〈x, ¯ˆX〉| ≤ ∆δ + 12d
ε
√
ln
5
4δ
· ln n
δ
.
This completes the proof.
We have now shown that lines 3-7 with high probability either reject X or alter it to ensure
that it satisfies (21), which is very similar to the membership condition for the set C from our
Lipschitz extension in Algorithm 1. The following lemma, which follows directly from Lemma
4.4, says condition (21) is sufficient to ensure that T has sufficiently low sensitivity.
Lemma 4.12 (Sensitivity of T ). Suppose Xˆ, Xˆ ′ are two sample sets of size n, which differ in
the nth data point. If both Xˆ and Xˆ ′ satisfy Equation (21) then
|T (Xˆ)− T (Xˆ ′)| ≤ 4∆δ + 48d
ε
√
ln
5
4δ
· ln n
δ
.
We have now established that with high probability, if X survives until line 13 then this step
adds enough noise to maintain privacy. The next lemma states that several of the other noise
infusion steps are individually differentially private. Since these mechanisms are applications of
well-known privacy mechanisms described in section 2.1, we will not include their proofs here.
Lemma 4.13. In the notation of Algorithm 2,
• the mechanism X 7→ z1 in line 2 is ε-DP,
• the mechanism X 7→ X˜ in line 4 is (ε, δ)-DP and
• Given a fixed (data independent) X˜, X 7→ z2 in line 7 is ε-DP.
We can now complete our proof of the privacy guarantees of Algorithm 2. As mentioned
earlier, this is not simply an application of the composition theorem for differential privacy since
the privacy guarantee of line 13 relies on the failure rates of earlier steps. Given two neighboring
datasets X and X ′, the proof couples the random variables in separate runs of Algorithm 2 on
X and X ′, to ensure that Xˆ and Xˆ ′ are neighboring datasets so we can apply Lemma 4.12.
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Lemma 4.14. Algorithm 2 is (4ε, 17δ)-differentially private.
Proof. Suppose X and X ′ differ on the nth data point. We can think of the random pro-
cess that maps X to Xˆ as a series of random variables. We denote these random samples by
(r1, R, r2, U, un, r3) where r1, R, r2 and r3 are as in Algorithm 2, U is the random samples that
occur in line 12 on all data points except the nth data point and un is the randomness poten-
tially used on the nth data point in line 12. Note that since the algorithm can terminate before
running the entire algorithm, not all runs of the algorithm will sample from all these random
variables.
Let CX,X˜ = |{j ∈ [n] : |〈X(j), X˜〉| > ∆δ + 4dε
√
ln 54δ · ln nδ }|. If we denote the output of
Algorithm 2 on dataset X with randomness (r1, R, r2, U, un, r3) by M(X | (r1, R, r2, U, un, r3))
then for any r1, R, r2, U, un and r3,
M(X | (r1, R, r2, U, un, r3))
=M(X ′ | (r1 + ‖X¯‖∞ − ‖X¯ ′‖∞, R+ X¯ − X¯ ′, r2 + CX,X˜ − CX′,X˜ , U, u′n, r3 + T (X̂(U,un))− T (X̂ ′(U,u′n))))
Since the mechanism X → X¯ + R is (ε, δ)-DP, there exists a set A such that Pr[R /∈ A] ≤ δ
and then Pr[(r1, R + X¯ − X¯ ′, r2, U, un, r3) ∈ A] ≤ eε Pr[(r1, R, r2, U, un, r3) ∈ A]. Let B1 be the
event that both X and X ′ pass line 3 and line 7 and B2 be the event that ˆ¯X and ˆ¯X ′ satisfy
equation (21). By Lemma 4.11, Pr[B1 ∩ Bc2] ≤ 16δ and by Lemma 4.12 if B1 ∩ B2 holds then,
for all a ∈ R,
Pr[r3 + T (X̂(U,un))− T (X̂ ′(U,u′n)) = a] ≤ eε Pr[r3 = a].
For b ∈ {ACCEPT, REJECT}, let EX,b = {(r1, R, r2, U, un, r3) | M(X|(r1, R, r2, U, un, r3)) = b}.
Now,
Pr[M(X) = b] = Pr[EX,b ∩Bc1] + Pr[EX,b ∩B1]
= Pr[EX,b ∩Bc1 ∩A] + Pr[EX,b ∩A ∩B1 ∩B2] + Pr[Ac] + Pr[B1 ∩Bc2]
≤ Pr[EX,b ∩Bc1 ∩A] + Pr[EX,b ∩A ∩B1 ∩B2] + 17δ.
If Bc1 holds then X is rejected in either line 3 or line 7. Since all the steps leading up to either
of these lines are differentially private by Lemma 4.13, we have
Pr[EX,b ∩Bc1 ∩A] ≤ e3ε Pr[EX′,b ∩Bc1 ∩A].
Note that, EX,b is also equal to
{(r1 + ‖X¯‖∞ − ‖X¯ ′‖∞, R+ X¯ − X¯ ′, r2 + CX,X˜ − CX′,X˜ , U,u′n, r3 + X̂(U,un) − X̂ ′(U,u′n))
|M(X ′|(r1, R, r2, U, un, r3)) = b},
so by the definition of A, B1 and B2,
Pr[EX,b ∩A ∩B1 ∩B2] ≤ e4ε Pr[EX′,b ∩A ∩B1 ∩B2].
Therefore,
Pr[M(X) = b] ≤ Pr[EX,b ∩A ∩Bc1 ∩B2] + Pr[EX,b ∩A ∩B1 ∩B2] + 17δ
≤ e4ε Pr[EX′,b] + 17δ
= e4ε Pr[M(X ′) = b] + 17δ.
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We now turn to proving that Algorithm 2 distinguishes between the cases P = Ud and
‖P − Ud‖1 ≥ α with probability 2/3. The crux of the proof can be summarized as
1. If P = Ud, then with high probability X passes the first check at line 3.
2. We can choose ∆δ such that:
(a) If X passes line 3 then X = Xˆ with high probability, so T (X) = T (Xˆ).
(b) The amount of noise added to T (Xˆ) is small enough that one can still distinguish
between the two hypotheses.
Notice that these steps are almost identical to the inefficient proof with Tˆ (X) replaced with
T (Xˆ). Since we needed to keep track of failure rates for our privacy proof, we already have most
of the ingredients we need for this proof.
Proof of Theorem 4.9. The privacy guarantee was established in Lemma 4.14.
Completeness: Suppose P = Ud. By Lemma 4.6, with probability 1 − 3δ, X survives line 3.
Conditioned on surviving line 3, by Lemma 4.7, we have that ∀j ∈ [n] |〈X(j), X¯〉| ≤ ∆δ, with
probability 1− 5δ. By inequality (24) and union bound, with probability 1− 10δ, ∀j ∈ [n],
|〈X(j), X˜〉| ≤ ∆δ + 4d
ε
√
ln
5
4δ
· ln n
δ
.
So, with probability 1 − 10δ, |{j ∈ [n] : |〈X(j), X˜〉| > ∆δ + 4dε
√
ln 54δ · ln nδ }| = 0. Since with
probability 1 − δ, |r2| < 1ε ln 1δ , it follows that z2 ≤ 1ε ln 1δ . Therefore, with probability 1 − 11δ,
X survives lines 3 and 7 and none of the points get changed in lines 8-12, that is, X = Xˆ.
As in the proof of Theorem 4.1, the remainder of the proof involves showing that for the
given choice of n, it holds that
ln(20)
ε
(
4∆δ +
48d
ε
√
ln
5
4δ
· ln n
δ
)
≤ n(n− 1)α
2
8
. (25)
Then we would have that with probability 0.95, |r3| ≤ n(n−1)α
2
8 and if in addition n = Ω
(
d1/2
α2
)
,
then we can show that the final test returns ACCEPT, with probability at least 0.9 − 11δ, as in
the proof of Theorem 4.1. For δ ≤ 0.02, this translates to success probability at least 2/3.
Condition (25) is satisfied when
n = Ω
(
d1/2
α2
+
d1/2
αε1/2
(
ln
d
δ
)1/2
+
d1/3
α2/3ε
(
ln
1
δ
)1/3
+
d1/3
α4/3ε2/3
(
ln
d
δ
)1/3(
ln
d
αεδ
)1/3
+
d1/4
αε
(
ln
1
δ
)1/2(
ln
d
αεδ
)1/4
+
d1/2
αε
(
ln
1
δ
)1/4(
ln
d
αεδ
)1/4)
.
Soundness: This follows exactly as in the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Ignoring the polylogarithmic factors and by Claim 4.8, the sample complexity is simplified to
n = O˜
(
d1/2
α2
+
d1/2
αε
)
.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 4.9.
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5 Balanced Identity Testing of Product Distributions
In previous sections, we considered only testing whether an unknown product distribution is
uniform. We will provide a generic reduction which preserves ℓ2-distance between means. In the
case where the distributions are “balanced” (i.e., the coordinate means are bounded away from
being −1 or 1), this will imply that our upper bounds carry over to this more general setting.
Lemma 5.1. Suppose we are given a known binary product distribution Q and a sample X ∼ P ,
where P is some unknown binary product distribution. There exists a (randomized) transforma-
tion Y = fQ(X) such that Y ∼ P ′, where P ′ is some unknown binary product distribution such
that ‖E[P ′]− E[Ud]‖2 = ‖E[P ′]‖2 = 12‖E[P ]− E[Q]‖2.
Proof. The transformation is as follows: for each coordinate i ∈ [d], sample bi ∼ Ber(1/2). If
bi = 0, then Yi = Xi: in this case, E[Yi] = E[Pi]. Otherwise, let Yi = 1 with probability
1−E[Qi]
2 ,
and −1 with probability 1+E[Qi]2 – in this case, E[Yi] = −E[Qi]. Putting these cases together, we
overall have that E[Yi] =
1
2(E[Pi]− E[Qi]). Since each coordinate is independent, we have that
Y ∼ P ′, where P ′ is a binary product distribution with the same mean. Overall, this gives us
that ‖E[P ′]‖22 = 14‖E[P ]− E[Q]‖22, which allows us to conclude the desired statement.
Corollary 5.2. Let τ > 0 be some fixed constant, and c = c(τ) be some sufficiently small
constant (which depends on τ). Let Q be some known product distribution over {±1}d, such that
−1 + τ ≤ E[Qi] ≤ 1− τ .
Suppose there exists an algorithm which takes n samples from an unknown product distribu-
tion P ′ over {±1}d and can distinguish between the following two cases with probability at least
2/3: (U1) P ′ = Ud, (U2) ‖P ′−Ud‖1 ≥ cα. Then there exists an algorithm which takes n samples
from an unknown product distribution P over {±1}d and can distinguish between the following
two cases with probability at least 2/3: (B1) P = Q, (B2) ‖P −Q‖1 ≥ α.
Proof. The proof will follow via Lemma 5.1: given a set of samples for the latter problem, we
convert them via the method of Lemma 5.1, and run the given algorithm for the former problem.
The former case is immediate, since equal product distributions will have equal mean vectors.
We thus consider the latter case, ‖P −Q‖1 ≥ α. The upper bound part of Lemma 2.8 implies
that ‖E[P ]− E[Q]‖2 ≥ α/C. Applying the conversion of Lemma 5.1 gives that ‖E[P ′]− Ud‖2 ≥
α/2C. We then argue that ‖P ′ − Ud‖1 ≥ cα, which follows from the lower bound of Lemma 2.8
(applied with P and Q equal to our P ′ and Ud, respectively), concluding the proof.
6 Extreme Product Distributions
In this section, we discuss algorithms and lower bounds for extreme product distributions.
Roughly speaking, an extreme product distribution is a product distribution with marginal
distributions which are sufficiently close to being deterministically either −1 or 1. More precisely,
we have the following:
Definition 6.1. Fix any constant C > 0. A C-extreme product distribution is a product
distribution over {±1}d with mean vector (p1, . . . , pd) such that, for all i ∈ [d], |pi − 1| ≤ C/d
or |pi + 1| ≤ C/d, and
∑d
i=1(1 + pi)/2 ≤ C. We often omit the dependence on the constant C
and refer to extreme distributions.
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We will show that, up to constant factors, the sample complexity of identity testing for
extreme product distributions and identity testing for univariate distributions are the same.
This statement holds even without privacy constraints, which we consider to be of independent
interest. We will show this via a pair of sample-complexity preserving reductions, which will
then allow us to immediately port results from the univariate private testing literature.
More precisely, we will show the following theorem.
Theorem 6.2. For n = Ω((log d)/ε), there is an O(n)-sample ε-differentially private algorithm
for testing identity to any distribution Quniv over [d] if and only if there is an O(n)-sample
ε-differentially private algorithm for testing identity to any extreme product distributions Qprod
over {±1}d.
This will be proven through a combination of Lemma 6.4 in Section 6.1, and Lemma 6.7
in Section 6.2. With Theorem 6.2 in place, we can conclude the following corollary, which is a
consequence of the corresponding statements for private univariate testing in [ASZ18].
Corollary 6.3. For every extreme product distribution Q ∈ {±1}d, there exists an ε-differentially
private algorithm which takes
n = O
(
d1/2
α2
+
d1/2
αε1/2
+
d1/3
α4/3ε2/3
+
1
αε
)
samples from some unknown product distribution P ∈ {±1}d and distinguishes between the cases
where P = Q and ‖P − Q‖1 ≥ α with probability at least 2/3. Furthermore, every algorithm
which has the same guarantees requires Ω(n) samples from P , as long as ε = Ω˜(1/d).
6.1 Reducing from Extreme Product Testing to Univariate Testing
In this section, we show the following, which shows that any univariate identity testing
algorithm implies a multivariate identity testing algorithm for extreme product distributions.1
Lemma 6.4. There exists a constant γ ∈ (0, 1] (depending only on the parameter C of extreme
distributions) such that the following holds. If there is an n-sample ε-DP algorithm for testing
identity to a distribution Quniv over [d] (with distance parameter γα), then there is an n
′-sample
ε-DP algorithm for testing identity to extreme product distributions over {±1}d (with distance
parameter α) where n′ = O(n+ (log d)/ε).
Proof. For convenience and ease of notation, we hereafter consider distributions over {0, 1}d
instead of the equivalent choice {±1}d, as this allows us to map more easily mean vectors of
product distributions to probability vectors of univariate distributions. Fix C ≥ 0, and suppose
there exists an algorithm A for testing identity (with distance parameter α) to distributions over
[d], with sample complexity n(α). Given a fixed C-extreme product distribution Qprod (with
mean vector q ∈ [0, 1]d) over {±1}d, and n samples from an unknown product distribution P
over {±1}d (with unknown mean vector p ∈ [0, 1]d), the claimed algorithm to test identity to
Qprod works as follows. First, without loss of generality (and up to flipping the corresponding
coordinates in all samples from P ), one can assume that 0 ≤ qi ≤ C/d for all i ∈ [d].
1We further note that the reduction is quite general, and can be straightforwardly adapted beyond differentially
private algorithms.
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The first step is to apply the differentially private algorithms from Lemmas 6.5 and 6.6, with
constant probability of failure 1/10 and privacy parameter ε/3 (and, for the second algorithm,
for τ set to max(1, C)), to the samples of P , and reject immediately if either test rejects (This
spends a total “privacy budget” of 2ε/3, so that we still have ε/3 to use in the rest, when calling
the univariate purported tester). These two tests are simultaneously correct with probability at
least 4/5; we then can continue assuming ‖p‖∞ ≤ 1/2 and ‖p‖1 ≤ 8max(1, C).
For any of the n samples X(1), . . . ,X(n) ∼ P :
• If X(i) = 0, then output a sample with value Yi ← d+ 1;
• If ‖X(i)‖ = 1, i.e., X(i) has exactly one non-zero coordinate, then output a sample Yi with
the value of this coordinate;
• If ‖X(i)‖ > 1, then output a sample with value Yi ← d+ 2.
This therefore generates n i.i.d. samples from some distribution Puniv over [d+2]. Moreover, since
Qprod is fully known, the corresponding distribution Quniv (which one would obtain by applying
this transformation to samples from Qprod) is uniquely specified and known; the algorithm then
invokes the univariate identity tester A on the n i.i.d. samples Y1, . . . , Yn to test identity to
Quniv.
• If P = Qprod, then we have Puniv = Quniv.
• If ‖P − Qprod‖1 > α, then ‖Puniv − Quniv‖1 > γα, where γ := e−C8(1+16max(1,C)) . To prove
this statement, we denote by ej the j-th vector of the canonical basis of R
d and observe
that by definition Puniv(d + 1) = P (0) =
∏d
i=1(1 − pi), while, for 1 ≤ j ≤ d, Puniv(j) =
P (ej) = pj
∏
i 6=j(1− pi) = pj1−pj · P (0). Hence,
‖Puniv −Quniv‖1 ≥
d+1∑
i=1
|Puniv(i)−Quniv(i)|
= |P (0) −Qprod(0)|+
d∑
i=1
| pi
1− pi · P (0)−
qi
1− qi ·Qprod(0)|
If |P (0) − Qprod(0)| > γα, then we are good; otherwise, |P (0) − Qprod(0)| ≤ γα, from
which we can bound the second term as
d∑
i=1
| pi
1− pi · P (0)−
qi
1− qi ·Qprod(0)|
≥ Qprod(0)
d∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣ pi1− pi − qi1− qi
∣∣∣∣− d∑
i=1
pi
1− pi |P (0) −Qprod(0)|
≥ Qprod(0)
d∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣ pi1− pi − qi1− qi
∣∣∣∣− γα d∑
i=1
pi
1− pi .
26
Observing that the function f : x ∈ [0, 1/2] → x1−x is smooth with f ′(x) ∈ [1/4, 1], we get
1
4 |x− y| ≤ |f(x)− f(y)| ≤ |x− y| for all x, y ∈ [0, 1/2].and therefore
d∑
i=1
| pi
1− pi · P (0)−
qi
1− qi ·Qprod(0)| ≥
Qprod(0)
4
d∑
i=1
|pi − qi| − 2γα
d∑
i=1
pi
≥ e
−C+O(1/d)
4
d∑
i=1
|pi − qi| − 16max(1, C)γα ,
where for the last inequality we used the fact that Qprod is C-extreme to bound Qprod(0),
and the fact that
∑d
i=1 pi ≤ 8max(1, C). For d large enough, e
−C+O(1/d)
4 ≥ e
−C
8 = (1 +
16max(1, C))γ, and therefore (recalling the folklore subadditive bound on total variation
distance with regard to product distributions)
d∑
i=1
| pi
1− pi · P (0)−
qi
1− qi ·Qprod(0)| ≥ (1 + 16max(1, C))γ
d∑
i=1
|pi − qi| − 16max(1, C)γα
≥ (1 + 16max(1, C))γ‖P −Qprod‖1 − 16max(1, C)γα
> γα ,
as claimed.
Correctness then follows from that of the purported univariate identity tester, called with privacy
parameter ε/3 and failure probability 1/5 (so that by a union bound, the overall correctness is
3/5, and the whole procedure is ε-differentially private).
It only remains to provide the proofs of the two helper subroutines we used in the reduction:
Lemma 6.5. There is an ε-differentially private algorithm which can distinguish between the
cases that a product distribution over {0, 1}d with mean vector p has ‖p‖∞ ≤ 1/4 versus ‖p‖∞ ≥
1/2 using n samples, for n = O((log d)/ε).
Proof. This will follow by an application of Report Noisy Max (see [DR14]). Draw n = Ω( log dε )
samples from the product distribution, and consider the d functions f1, . . . , fd, where fi computes
the empirical marginal distribution for coordinate i. Note that each fi has sensitivity 1/n, so by
the guarantees of Report Noisy Max, it is ε-differentially private to output fˆi∗ , maxi∈[d] fi +
Lap(1/nε). By a Chernoff bound, union bound, and tail bounds on Laplace random variables,
the difference between fˆi and pi will be bounded by O(
√
(log d)/n+(log d)/(nε)), simultaneously
for all i ∈ [d], with probability at least 99/100. By choosing n = Ω((log d)/ε), we upper-bound
this error term by 1/8. Therefore, thresholding the value of fˆi∗ at the value 3/8 will distinguish
the two cases, as desired.
Lemma 6.6. For any τ ≥ 1, there is an ε-differentially private algorithm which can distinguish
between the cases that a product distribution over {0, 1}d with mean vector p has ‖p‖1 ≤ τ versus
‖p‖1 ≥ 8τ using n samples, for n = O(1/ε).
Proof. The algorithm will first draw n samples, and compute the fraction f of these draws which
have at least 8τ ones. Note that this statistic has sensitivity 1/n, so to privatize it, we can add a
Lap(1/nε) random variable, giving us a statistic fˆ . If the result is at most 3/8, then we output
that ‖p‖1 ≤ τ , else, we output that ‖p‖1 ≥ 8τ .
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Let r be the probability that a single string has at least 4τ ones. We start by showing that
there exists a gap in the value of r in the two cases. Let N denote the number of 1’s is a randomly
drawn string from p. We have E[X] ≤ τ and E[X] ≥ 8τ ≥ 8 in the two cases, respectively. By
Markov’s inequality, this means that in the first case, r ≤ 1/4. Moreover, a simple computation
shows that Var[X] = E[X]−∑di=1 p2i ≤ E[X], so that, by Chebyshev’s inequality, in the second
case we get 1 − r ≤ P[|X − E[X]| > E[X]/2] ≤ 4/E[X] ≤ 1/2, and therefore r ≥ 1/2. By a
Chernoff bound and a tail bound on Laplace random variables, the difference between the fˆ and
r will be bounded by O(1/
√
n+ 1/(nε)). If we choose n = Ω(1/ε), we upper bound this error
term by 1/16, and thresholding at 3/8 will distinguish the two cases, as desired.
6.2 Reducing from Univariate Testing to Extreme Product Testing
In this section, we will prove the following lemma:
Lemma 6.7. There exists an absolute constant c > 0 such that the following holds. If there is a
cn-sample algorithm for testing identity to any extreme product distribution Qprod over {±1}d,
then there is an n-sample algorithm for testing identity to any distribution Quniv over [d] such
that ‖Quniv‖ = O(1/d). Moreover, if the former algorithm is ε-DP, then so is the latter.
This will be established via a sequence of reductions: from univariate testing to Poissonized
univariate testing (Lemma 6.8), to extreme product testing (Lemma 6.9); before one final ob-
servation letting us get rid of one assumption stemming from the last reduction (Remark 6.10).
We describe these reductions in the following subsections.
6.2.1 Univariate to Poissonized Univariate
The first reduction we perform is from having a dataset of fixed size, to drawing a dataset
of variable size. This technique is known as “Poissonization,” and is folklore in the distribu-
tion testing literature (see, e.g., [Can15, Appendix D.3]). We include the argument here for
completeness. Drawing a random number of samples (Poi(n)), rather than a fixed budget (n),
has the advantage that the frequency of each symbol i ∈ [d] will be distributed as Poi(n · Pi),
independently. At the same time, with high probability, Poi(n) ≤ O(n), so one can simulate
drawing Poi(n) samples with a fixed budget, at the cost of a constant factor overhead.
Lemma 6.8. If there is an algorithm which draws Poi(n) samples and tests identity to a distri-
bution Quniv over [d] with probability of failure at most δ (and distance parameter α), then there
is a 2n-sample algorithm for testing identity to Quniv with probability of failure at most δ+1/10
(and distance parameter α).
Proof. Consider the algorithm which draws N ∼ Poi(n) samples. With high probability, this
will draw at most 2n samples. More precisely (see, e.g., [Can17]), we have that Pr[N ≥ 2n] ≤
exp
(
−n22n
)
= exp
(−n2 ). For n larger than some absolute constant, this is less than an arbitrarily
small constant.
With this in mind, we describe the 2n-sample algorithm. It begins by drawing its own
N ∼ Poi(n). If N > 2n, it outputs arbitrarily. Otherwise, it runs the algorithm which takes
Poi(n) samples, on a set of N samples (drawn uniformly at random from its set of 2n samples).
Correctness follows from correctness of the Poissonized tester: the only change is that the
probability of failure increases by Pr[N > 2n], which as argued before, will be less than an
arbitrarily small constant (e.g., 1/10) for n greater than some absolute constant.
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6.2.2 Poissonized Univariate to Extreme Product
For convenience and ease of notation, we hereafter consider distributions over {0, 1}d instead
of the equivalent choice {±1}d.
Lemma 6.9. Fix any constant C ≥ 1. Suppose n ≥ c log d, where c > 0 is a suitably large
absolute constant. If there is an algorithm which takes n samples and tests identity to a distribu-
tion Qprod on {0, 1}d with probability of failure at most δ (and distance parameter α′ := eCα/2),
then there is an algorithm which draws Poi(2n) samples and tests identity to any univariate
distribution such that ‖Quniv‖∞ ≤ C/d, with probability of failure at most δ+1/10 (and distance
parameter α). Moreover, if the former algorithm is ε-DP, then so is the latter.
In addition, as will be clear from the proof below, the reduction then guarantees that the
product distribution Qprod obtained from such Quniv will satisfy ‖E[Qprod]‖∞ ≤ C/d, i.e., is a
C-extreme product distribution. Therefore, the above reduction holds even when only requiring
a testing algorithm for identity to extreme product distributions.
Proof. Consider the following process: taking Poi(2n) samples from a univariate distribution
P = (p1, . . . , pd) over [d], one obtains independent random variables N1, . . . , Nd such that
Ni ∼ Poi(2npi). Now, draw M1, . . . ,Md ∼ Poi(2n) (mutually independent, and independent
of (Ni)i∈[d]), and set N ′i ← Ni +Mi for all i ∈ [d].
Clearly, the random variables N ′1, . . . , N ′d are mutually independent, and further N
′
i | Mi
is distributed as Bin(Mi, pi/(1 + pi)), by properties of Poisson random variables and since
E[Ni]
E[Ni]+E[Mi]
= 2npi2npi+2n =
pi
1+pi
.
Let now M ← mini∈[d]Mi. For each i ∈ [d], define a random binary vector V (i) ∈ {0, 1}Mi
obtained by choosing uniformly at random a subset of [Mi] of sizeNi and filling the corresponding
coordinates with 1, setting the Mi −Ni coordinates to 0; then defining Ti as
Ti ←
M∑
j=1
V
(i)
j
that is, the number of coordinates set to 1 among the firstM . We then have Ti ∼ Bin(M,pi/(1+
pi)); further, conditioned on M , all the Ti’s are independent.
The outcome of this process is then a (d + 1)-tuple (M,T1, . . . , Td); we convert this into M
i.i.d. samples from the product distribution Pprod on {0, 1}d such that E[(Pprod)i] = pi1+pi in
the natural way, by building an M -by-d binary matrix with exactly Ti ones in the i-th column,
before permuting independently and uniformly at random each column.
To conclude, we claim that as long as n ≥ c log d (for some absolute constant c > 0), then
P[M ≥ n] ≥ 910 . This follows from concentration of Poisson r.v.’s (again, see e.g., [Can17]) and
a union bound over the d i.i.d. random variables M1, . . . ,Md.
The tester for Quniv then proceeds as follows: given Poi(2n) samples from an unknown P
over [d], it applies the above procedure and, with probability at least 9/10, succeeds in producing
n i.i.d. samples from the distribution Pprod over {0, 1}d such that E[(Pprod)i] = pi1+pi ; it then
runs the identity tester for Quniv on those n samples. (When the reduction procedure fails, i.e.,
when M < n, then the tester outputs arbitrarily.) Correctness then follows from the below
observations:
• If P = Quniv, then Pprod = Qprod;
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• If ‖P −Quniv‖1 ≥ α, then ‖Pprod −Qprod‖1≥ α.
The first item is obvious; we hereafter establish the second. Denoting by ej the j-th standard
vector of the canonical basis of {0, 1}d, and by 0 the all-zero vector, we have
‖Pprod −Qprod‖1 ≥ |Pprod(0)−Qprod(0)| +
d∑
j=1
|Pprod(ej)−Qprod(ej)|
=
∣∣∣∣∣
d∏
i=1
(1− p′i)−
d∏
i=1
(1− q′i)
∣∣∣∣∣+
d∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣ p′j1− p′j
d∏
i=1
(1− p′i)−
q′j
1− q′j
d∏
i=1
(1− q′i)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
d∏
i=1
1
1 + pj
−
d∏
i=1
1
1 + qj
∣∣∣∣∣+
d∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣pj
d∏
i=1
1
1 + pj
− qj
d∏
i=1
1
1 + qj
∣∣∣∣∣
where we wrote p′i :=
pi
1+pi
(and similarly for q′i) for conciseness. If the first term, |Pprod(0) −
Qprod(0)|, is greater than e−Cα/2, then we are done. Otherwise, we have, by the triangle
inequality,
d∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣pj
d∏
i=1
1
1 + pj
− qj
d∏
i=1
1
1 + qj
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥
d∏
i=1
1
1 + qj
d∑
j=1
|pj − qj | −
∣∣∣∣∣
d∏
i=1
1
1 + pj
−
d∏
i=1
1
1 + qj
∣∣∣∣∣
d∑
j=1
pj
≥
d∏
i=1
1
1 + qj
‖P −Quniv‖1 − e−C α
2
using that
∑d
j=1 pj = 1. However, since we had assumed ‖Quniv‖∞ ≤ C/d, we can bound∏d
i=1
1
1+qj
≥ 1
(1+C/d)d
≥ e−C , and thus overall ‖Pprod −Qprod‖1≥ e−C2 α in this case too.
Remark 6.10. The reader may observe that the “if and only if” statement of Theorem 6.2
does not seem to quite follow from the combination of Lemmata 6.4 and 6.7. Indeed, the latter
only establishes that a private identity testing algorithm for extreme product distributions yields a
private identity testing algorithm for univariate distributions with small infinity norm. However,
this is not an issue, as a standard reduction due to Goldreich [Gol16] shows that any univariate
uniformity testing algorithm implies a general univariate identity testing algorithm with only a
constant loss in parameters; and this reduction preserves differential privacy. Theorem 6.2 thus
follows from combining this last reduction with Lemma 6.7.
7 Lower Bounds
In this section, we state information-theoretic lower bounds for differentially private testing
in high dimensions. While the following theorem is stated for uniformity testing of product
distributions, it also holds for the more general problem of identity testing, as well as the related
problem of Gaussian mean testing. Recall that we also proved a lower bound on the complexity
of identity testing as Corollary 6.3 in Section 6, though the instance considered there is an
“extreme” product distribution (i.e., not the uniform distribution).
Theorem 7.1. Any ε-differentially private algorithm which draws n samples from an unknown
product distribution P ∈ {±1}d and, with probability at least 2/3, distinguishes between the cases
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P = Q and ‖P −Q‖1 ≥ α where Q is the uniform distribution over {±1}d, requires
n = Ω
(
d1/2
α2
+
1
αε
)
.
The first term in the lower bound is the non-private sample complexity of this problem [CDKS17,
DDK18], and the third term is the sample complexity of testing uniformity of a Bernoulli distri-
bution (see, e.g., [ASZ18]).
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A An Efficient Private Algorithm for Gaussian Mean Testing
We present in full our computationally efficient private algorithm for multivariate Gaussian
mean testing (Algorithm 3). In this setting, P is a multivariate Gaussian distribution with
identity covariance matrix and unknown mean, that is, P = N (µ, Id×d) for some unknown
µ = (µ1, . . . , µd) ∈ Rd. By drawing samples from P , we aim to distinguish between the cases
P = N (0, Id×d) and ‖P −N (0, Id×d)‖1 ≥ α, with probability at least 2/3.
Algorithm 3 uses a noisy version of the same statistic that is used in the non-private folklore
test and in our uniformity testing algorithms from Section 4:
T (X) =
d∑
i=1
(
X¯2i − n
)
(26)
For any two neighboring datasets X ∼ X ′ differing on the n-th sample, the sensitivity of T
is bounded by
|T (X) − T (X ′)| ≤ 2|〈X(n), X¯〉|+ 2|〈X ′(n), X¯ ′〉|+ ‖X ′(n)‖22. (27)
This follows from inequality (10) in the proof of Lemma 4.4. By this bound, the desired condition
that datasets must satisfy in order for T to have low sensitivity – a condition similar to (20) – is
∀j ∈ [n] |〈X(j), X¯〉| ≤ ∆Gδ and ‖X(j)‖22 ≤ ∆Gδ . (28)
If indeed P = N (0, Id×d), then, with high probability, condition (28) is satisfied. Following
the same thinking as with uniformity testing, Algorithm 3 performs the same type of tests and
modifications to make sure the dataset satisfies a condition similar to (28) before and if it reaches
the final test, which involves the statistic T .
The additional challenge of multivariate Gaussian mean testing is that the samples are not
bounded. While truncating the samples is necessary, we also need to ensure that any Gaussian
dataset will likely remain unchanged through the execution of the algorithm, so that the final
test, which involves the statistic T , is accurate. To achieve this, we estimate the low sensitivity
quantity |mi(X)| = 1n |
∑n
j=1 1{X(j)i ≤ 0}− n2 |, which, for Gaussian datasets, acts as a proxy for
the mean of the i-th coordinate. Due to the good concentration properties of Gaussian random
variables, the datasets that pass the test of line 5 are guaranteed to lie in a small range [−B,B]
with high probability, so that the truncation, which follows in line 6, will not change any of the
samples. The new bound B comes in the new condition (28), as we will define ∆Gδ = B
2∆δ.
The main theorem of this section is the following:
Theorem A.1. Algorithm 3 is (5ε, 21δ)-differentially private and for P = N (µ, Id×d) it distin-
guishes between the cases P = N (0, Id×d) and ‖P − N (0, Id×d)‖1 ≥ α with probability at least
2/3, having sample complexity
n = O˜
(
d1/2
α2
+
d1/2
αε
)
.
First, we prove the guarantees of the non-private test, on which our algorithm is based.
Lemma A.2 (Non-private Test Guarantees). For T defined as in (26), the following hold:
• E[T (X)] = n2‖µ‖22.
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• Var(T (X)) = 2n2d+ 4n3‖µ‖22.
Proof. We have, recalling that P has identity covariance matrix, that it is a product distribution
with i-th marginal distributed as N (µi, 1),
E[T (X)] =
d∑
i=1
 ∑
1≤j1,j2≤n
E[X
(j1)
i X
(j2)
i ]− n
 = d∑
i=1
 n∑
j=1
E[(X
(j)
i )
2] +
∑
j1 6=j2
E[X
(j1)
i ]E[X
(j2)
i ]
− nd
=
d∑
i=1
 n∑
j=1
E[(X
(j)
i )
2] +
 n∑
j=1
E[X
(j)
i ]
2 − n∑
j=1
E[X
(j)
i ]
2
− nd
=
d∑
i=1
 n∑
j=1
Var(X
(j)
i ) +
 n∑
j=1
E[X
(j)
i ]
2− nd = d∑
i=1
(
n+ n2µ2i
)− nd = n2‖µ‖22,
as claimed. Now, for the variance. Using independence among coordinates, we have
Var(T (X)) =
d∑
i=1
Var
 ∑
1≤j1,j2≤n
X
(j1)
i X
(j2)
i − n
 = d∑
i=1
Var
∑
j1,j2
X
(j1)
i X
(j2)
i

=
d∑
i=1
E
∑
j1,j2
X
(j1)
i X
(j2)
i
2− E
∑
j1,j2
X
(j1)
i X
(j2)
i
2.
We have already, that
∑
j1,j2
E
[
X
(j1)
i X
(j2)
i
]
= n2µ2i + n. This takes care of the second term; as
for the first, we expand
E
[(∑
j1,j2
X
(j1)
i X
(j2)
i
)2]
=
∑
1≤j1,j2,j3,j4≤n
E
[
X
(j1)
i X
(j2)
i X
(j3)
i X
(j4)
i
]
= n(µ4i + 6µ
2
i + 3) + 24
(
n
4
)
µ4i + 8
(
n
2
)
µ2i (µ
2
i + 3) + 6
(
n
2
)
(µ2i + 1)
2 + 36
(
n
3
)
µ2i (µ
2
i + 1)
= 3n2 + 6n3µ2i + n
4µ4i .
Combining the two, we get
Var(T (X)) =
d∑
i=1
(
3n2 + 6n3µ2i + n
4µ4i − (n2µ2i + n)2
)
=
d∑
i=1
(
2n2 + 4n3µ2i
)
= 2n2d+ 4n3‖µ‖22,
as stated.
To prove the privacy guarantee of our main Theorem A.1, we need to show that with high
probability Xˆ satisfies a property similar to equation (28), which can not be derived by a
simple application of the composition theorem. We first show that the new replacement samples
potentially drawn in lines 16-20 satisfy (28).
Lemma A.3. Let X be a dataset that passes line 11 of Algorithm 3. Suppose N (j) ∼ N (0, Id×d)
for j ∈ [n].Then with probability 1− 7δ, ∀j ∈ [n],
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• N (j)i ∈ [−B,B], ∀i ∈ [d], where B = 3
√
ln ndδ as defined in Algorithm 3.
• ∣∣〈N (j), X¯〉∣∣ ≤ ∆Gδ .
Proof. We have that for all j ∈ [n] and i ∈ [d], N (j)i ∼ N (0, 1). By the Gaussian tail bound, we
get that for all i ∈ [d] and j ∈ [n], with probability 1 − 2δ, |N (j)i | ≤
√
2 ln ndδ ≤ B. Therefore,
the first point holds, with probability 1 − 2δ. Conditioned on that and since X has passed
line 11, by following the same steps as the proof of Lemma 4.7, we get that with probability
1− 5δ − 2δ = 1− 7δ, for all x ∈ X, |〈x, X¯〉| ≤ ∆δB2 = ∆Gδ , which is the stated bound.
Lemma A.4. Let X be a dataset that passes line 15 of Algorithm 3. For every point x ∈ Xˆ it
holds that, with probability 1− 10δ,
‖x‖22 ≤ ∆Gδ and |〈x, ¯ˆX〉| ≤ ∆Gδ +
108d
ε
ln
nd
δ
√
ln
n
δ
· ln 5
4δ
.
Proof. Since X passed line 15, it has also passed the truncation step in line 6. By Lemma A.3,
all the new data points are also bounded in [−B,B], with probability 1− 7δ. It follows that for
all x ∈ Xˆ , ‖x‖22 ≤ dB2 ≤ 9d ln ndδ ≤ ∆Gδ . It remains to prove the second inequality.
Since X passed line 15, z3 ≤ ln(1/δ)ε . By Lemma 2.5, with probability 1− δ, |r3| ≤ ln(1/δ)ε , so
|{j ∈ [n] : |〈X(j), X˜〉| > ∆Gδ +
36d
ε
ln
nd
δ
√
ln
n
δ
· ln 5
4δ
}| ≤ 2
ε
ln
1
δ
.
Therefore, X and Xˆ differ in at most 2ε ln
1
δ data points. Thus, with probability 1− 8δ, ∀x ∈ Xˆ,
|〈x, ¯ˆX〉| ≤ |〈x, X¯〉|+ |〈x, X¯ − ¯ˆX〉| ≤ |〈x, X¯〉|+ 4dB
2
ε
ln
1
δ
= |〈x, X¯〉|+ 36d
ε
ln
nd
δ
· ln 1
δ
. (29)
If x was resampled in line 18 then by Lemma A.3, we are done. Otherwise, if x was not resampled
then by assumption |〈x, X˜〉| ≤ ∆Gδ + 36dε ln ndδ
√
ln nδ · ln 54δ . It holds that
|〈x, X¯〉| ≤ |〈x, X˜〉|+ |〈x, X¯ − X˜〉| ≤ ∆Gδ +
36d
ε
ln
nd
δ
√
ln
n
δ
· ln 5
4δ
+ |〈x, X¯ − X˜〉|. (30)
Now, X¯−X˜ = R whereR ∼ N (0, σ2Id×d) and σ = B
√
8d ln(5/4δ)/ε, as in line 12 of Algorithm 3.
By symmetry, |〈x,R〉| ≤ B ·
∣∣∣∑di=1 Yi∣∣∣, where each Yi ∼ N (0, σ2). It follows that with probability
1− 2δ,
∣∣∣∑di=1 Yi∣∣∣ ≤ σ√2d ln nδ ≤ 4dBε √ln nδ · ln 54δ . So ∀x ∈ X,
|〈x, X¯ − X˜〉| ≤ 4dB
2
ε
√
ln
n
δ
· ln 5
4δ
≤ 36d
ε
ln
nd
δ
√
ln
n
δ
· ln 5
4δ
. (31)
Therefore, by union bound and inequalities (29) and (30), with probability 1−10δ, for all x ∈ Xˆ,
‖x‖22 ≤ ∆Gδ and |〈x, ¯ˆX〉| ≤ ∆Gδ +
108d
ε
ln
nd
δ
√
ln
n
δ
· ln 5
4δ
.
This concludes the proof of the lemma.
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Lemma A.5. Algorithm 3 is (5ε, 21δ)-differentially private.
Proof. By Lemma A.4 and inequality (27), with probability 1 − 20δ, for any two neighboring
datasets X ∼ X ′ that reach line 22, Xˆ and Xˆ ′ satisfy condition (28). Therefore, for Xˆ ∼ Xˆ ′,
|T (Xˆ)− T (Xˆ ′)| ≤ 5∆Gδ +
432d
ε
ln
nd
δ
√
ln
n
δ
· ln 5
4δ
.
This ensures that with probability 1− 20δ, the noise added in the last test in line 22 is sufficient
to ensure privacy. As in Section 4, the first observation towards proving the privacy guarantee is
that the applications of the Laplace mechanism in lines 5, 11, and 15 are ε-DP and the application
of the Gaussian mechanism in line 12 is (ε, δ)-DP. Now, by coupling the random variables in
separate runs of Algorithm 3 on X and X ′, to ensure that Xˆ and Xˆ ′ are neighboring databases
exactly as in the proof of Lemma 4.14, we get that our algorithm is (5ε, 21δ)-DP.
We now turn to the utility guarantee of our main theorem. As in the previous section, the
crux of the proof is as follows:
1. If P = N (0, Id×d), then with high probability X passes the first two checks at line 5 and 11.
2. If P = N (µ, Id×d), then:
(a) If X passes the first two checks at line 5 and 11, then X = Xˆ with high probability,
so T (X) = T (Xˆ).
(b) The amount of noise added to T (Xˆ) is small enough that one can still distinguish
between the two hypotheses.
We will now prove some important properties of the first test of line 5 of Algorithm 3, which
guarantee that for multivariate Gaussian distributions, the estimate |mi(X)| is close to the
absolute mean |µi| of each coordinate.
Lemma A.6. Suppose P = N (µ, Id×d) and let {mi(X)}di=1 as defined in line 2 of Algorithm 3.
• If µi = 0, then E[mi(X)] = 0.
• |E[mi(X)]| ≥ 0.84 ·min
{ |µi|√
2
, 1
}
.
• With probability 1− 2δ, |mi(X)− E[mi(X)]| ≤
√
ln(d/δ)√
n
for all i ∈ [d].
Proof. Let Y
(j)
i = 1{X(j)i ≤ 0} for i ∈ [d], j ∈ [n]. Let us calculate E[mi(X)].
E
[
ci(X)
n
− 1
2
]
=
1
n
n∑
j=1
E[Y
(j)
i ]−
1
2
=
1
n
n∑
j=1
Pr[X
(j)
i ≤ 0]−
1
2
=
1
n
n∑
j=1
Φ(−µi)− 1
2
= Erf
(
− µi√
2
)
,
where Φ(x) is the CDF of N (0, 1) and Erf(x) = 1√
pi
∫ x
−x exp(−t2) dx the error function. The first
point follows, since Erf(0) = 0. The second point follows by Lemma 3.2. It remains to prove
the third point. By Hoeffding’s inequality, for all i ∈ [d],
Pr
∣∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
j=1
Y
(j)
i − E
 n∑
j=1
Y
(j)
i
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > t
 ≤ 2 exp(−2t2/n).
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Setting t =
√
n ln dδ and by union bound, we get that with probability 1 − 2δ, for all i ∈ [d],
|mi(X) − E[mi(x)]| = 1n |ci(X) − E[ci(X)]| ≤
√
ln(d/δ)√
n
.
We can now prove that if P = N (0, Id×d), then X will pass the first two tests with high
probability.
Lemma A.7. With probability 1−6δ, if P = N (0, Id×d) then Algorithm 3 does not reject neither
in line 5, nor in line 11.
Proof. Suppose P = N (0, Id×d), that is, µi = 0 for all i ∈ [d]. By Lemma A.6, E[mi(X)] = 0
and |mi(X)| ≤
√
ln(d/δ)√
n
for all i ∈ [d], with probability at least 1 − 2δ. It follows that, with
probability 1− 2δ,
max
i∈[d]
|mi(X)| ≤
√
ln(d/δ)√
n
. (32)
Let r1 ∼ Lap(1/εn) as in Algorithm 3. By Lemma 2.5, with probability 1 − δ, |r1| ≤ ln(1/δ)εn .
Combined with (32), we get that, with probability 1− 3δ,
z1 = max
i∈[d]
|mi(X)| + r1 ≤
√
ln(d/δ)√
n
+
ln(1/δ)
εn
,
showing that the dataset X will pass line 5.
For the test of line 11, we first observe that, since P = N (0, Id×d), E[X¯i] = 0 for all i ∈ [d]
and that, due to the truncation in line 6, for all the samples it holds that |X(j)i | ≤ B, where
B = 3
√
ln ndδ . Following the same steps as Lemma 4.6, we get that with probability 1− 3δ,
z2 ≤ 3
√
2n ln
nd
δ
· ln d
δ
+
6
ε
√
ln
nd
δ
ln
1
δ
,
showing that the dataset X will pass line 11.
Therefore, X will pass both the test in line 5 and the test in line 11, with probability
1− 6δ.
Using Lemma A.6, we can also prove that all Gaussian datasets that pass the first two tests
remain unchanged for the rest of the algorithm. The following lemma states that the dataset
will not be modified during the truncation phase in line 6.
Lemma A.8. Suppose P = N (µ, Id×d). If dataset X passes line 5 of Algorithm 3, then, with
probability 1− 5δ, no truncation occurs in line 6.
Proof. Since X passed line 5, it holds that z1 = max
i∈[d]
|mi(X)| + r1 ≤
√
ln(d/δ)√
n
+ ln(1/δ)εn . By
Lemma 2.5, with probability 1− δ, |r1| ≤ ln(1/δ)εn . So with probability 1− δ, for all i ∈ [d],
|mi(X)| ≤
√
ln(d/δ)√
n
+
2 ln(1/δ)
εn
. (33)
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By Lemma A.6, with probability 1− 2δ, |mi(X)−E[mi(X)]| ≤
√
ln(d/δ)√
n
for all i ∈ [d]. By union
bound and inequality (33), with probability 1−3δ, for all i ∈ [d], |E[mi(X)]| ≤ 2
√
ln(d/δ)√
n
+ 2 ln(1/δ)εn .
Again by Lemma A.6, the last inequality implies that with probability 1− 3δ, for all i ∈ [d],
0.84 ·min
{ |µi|√
2
, 1
}
≤ 2
√
ln(d/δ)√
n
+
2 ln(1/δ)
εn
. (34)
Since the algorithm has passed line 1, n ≥ max{25 ln dδ , 5ε ln 1δ}, and we get 2√ln(d/δ)√n + 2 ln(1/δ)εn ≤
0.8 < 0.84. So it must be that |µi| <
√
2, since inequality (34) can not be satisfied otherwise.
Then it holds that
0.84|µi|√
2
≤ 2
√
ln(d/δ)√
n
+
2 ln(1/δ)
εn
⇒ |µi| ≤ 3.4
√
ln(d/δ)√
n
+
3.4 ln(1/δ)
εn
. (35)
Since all X
(j)
i ∼ N (µi, 1), we have the tail bound
Pr
[∣∣∣X(j)i − µi∣∣∣ > t] ≤ 2 exp(−t2/2).
Setting t =
√
2 ln ndδ , we get that with probability 1−2δ, for all i ∈ [d] and j ∈ [n], |X
(j)
i | ≤ |µi|+t.
Replacing the chosen t and by inequality (35),
|X(j)i | ≤
3.4
√
ln(d/δ)√
n
+
3.4 ln(1/δ)
εn
+
√
2 ln
nd
δ
< 3
√
ln
nd
δ
,
where the last inequality follows from our condition on n.
We have proven that, if X passes line 5, then with probability 1 − 5δ, all samples already
fall within the desired range [−B,B], so the truncation does not affect the dataset.
The following lemma states that all datasets that survive line 11 satisfy the desired condi-
tions (28), which is sufficient to establish that with high probability, the dataset will not be
modified during the resampling phase in lines 16-20.
Lemma A.9. Let X be a dataset that passes line 11 of Algorithm 3. With probability 1 − 5δ,
for all x ∈ X,
|〈x, X¯〉| ≤ 225
(
d ln
d
δ
+
d
nε2
ln2
1
δ
+
√
nd
√
ln
d
δ
· ln n
δ
+
√
d
ε
ln
1
δ
√
ln
n
δ
)
ln
nd
δ
.
Proof. Observe that, due to the truncation in line 6, ∀k ∈ [n] and ∀i ∈ [d], |X(k)i | ≤ B. Following
the same steps as the proof of Lemma 4.7, we get that with probability 1 − 5δ, for all x ∈ X,
|〈x, X¯〉| ≤ ∆δB2, which is the stated bound.
We will now prove the main theorem of this section.
Proof of Theorem A.1. The privacy guarantee was established in Lemma A.5. Now, for the
utility guarantee.
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Completeness: Suppose P = N (0, Id×d). By Lemma A.7, with probability 1 − 6δ, X passes
line 5 and line 11. Also, by Lemma A.8, with probability 1 − 5δ, it does not get truncated in
line 6 in the meantime. So with probability 1 − 11δ, X has passed line 11 and reached line 15,
unchanged.
By Lemma A.9 and union bound, with probability 1−16δ, for the chosen ∆Gδ , |〈x, X¯〉| ≤ ∆Gδ
holds for all x ∈ X.
As we have showed, by inequality (31), with probability 1− 2δ, for all x ∈ X,
|〈x, X¯ − X˜〉| ≤ 36d
ε
ln
nd
δ
√
ln
n
δ
· ln 5
4δ
.
It follows that with probability 1− 18δ, ∀x ∈ X, |〈x, X˜〉| ≤ ∆Gδ + 36dε ln ndδ
√
ln nδ · ln 54δ .
By Lemma 2.5, with probability 1 − δ, |r3| ≤ ln(1/δ)ε , so with probability 1 − 19δ, z3 ≤ ln(1/δ)ε .
Thus, the dataset survives line 15 as well and no points are modified in lines 16-20. Since, with
probability 1 − 19δ, the dataset reaches the last test in line 22 unchanged, it only remains to
prove that the last test is accurate with high probability.
By Lemma 2.5, with probability 0.95, |r4| ≤ ln(20)ε
(
5∆Gδ +
432d
ε ln
nd
δ
√
ln nδ · ln 54δ
)
. We want
the following to hold:
ln(20)
ε
(
5∆Gδ +
432d
ε
ln
nd
δ
√
ln
n
δ
· ln 5
4δ
)
≤ n
2α2
8 · 81 (36)
If this is true, we have |r4| ≤ n2α28·81 . Then, with probability 0.95 − 19δ,
Pr
[
z4 >
n2α2
4 · 81
]
= Pr
[
T (X) >
n2α2
4 · 81 − r3
]
(T (Xˆ) = T (X))
≤ Pr
[
T (X) >
n2α2
8 · 81
]
(|r4| ≤ n2α28·81 )
= Pr
[
T (X) >
n2α2
8 · 81 + E[T (X)]
]
(Lemma A.2)
≤ 8
2 · 812Var(T (X))
n4α4
(Chebyshev’s inequality)
≤ 8
2 · 812 · 2d
n2α4
(Lemma A.2)
For n = Ω
(
d1/2
α2
)
, it holds that Pr
[
z4 >
n2α2
4·81
]
≤ 0.05. So with probability 0.9− 19δ, z4 ≤ n2α2324 .
Condition (36) and n = Ω
(
d1/2
α2
)
is satisfied for
n = Ω
(
d1/2
α2
+
d1/2
αε1/2
(
ln
1
δ
)1/2(
ln
d
αεδ
)1/2
+
d1/3
α2/3ε
(
ln
1
δ
)2/3(
ln
d
αεδ
)1/3
+
d1/3
α4/3ε2/3
(
ln
d
δ
)1/3(
ln
d
αεδ
)
+
d1/4
αε
(
ln
1
δ
)1/2(
ln
d
αεδ
)3/4
+
d1/2
αε
(
ln
1
δ
)1/4(
ln
d
αεδ
)3/4)
,
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Notice that for this value of n, Algorithm 3 does not reject in line 1 either. Thus, for this
value of n and δ ≤ 0.01, Algorithm 3 returns ACCEPT, with probability 2/3.
Soundness: Suppose P = N (µ, Id×d) and ‖P − N (0, Id×d)‖1 ≥ α. Let us assume that the
algorithm does not return REJECT in line 1, 5, or 11, which is the desired output in this case.
Since X has passed line 11, by Lemma A.8 and Lemma A.9, with probability 1 − 10δ, X does
not get truncated in line 6 and for all x ∈ X, |〈x, X¯〉| ≤ ∆Gδ . Similar to the completeness proof,
with probability 0.95 − 13δ, the dataset reaches the last test in line 22 unchanged and for the
chosen n, |r4| ≤ n2α28·81 . Before proving the accuracy of the last test in line 22, note that since
‖P −N (0, Id×d)‖1 ≥ α, by Lemma 2.7, we have that ‖µ‖22 ≥ α2/81. So, by Lemma A.2,
E[T (X)] ≥ n
2α2
81
. (37)
With probability 0.95 − 13δ,
Pr
[
z4 ≤ n
2α2
4 · 81
]
= Pr
[
T (X) ≤ n
2α2
4 · 81 − r4
]
(T (Xˆ) = T (X))
≤ Pr
[
T (X) ≤ 3n
2α2
8 · 81
]
(|r4| ≤ n2α28·81 )
≤ Pr
[
T (X) ≤ 3E[T (X)]
8
]
(by (37))
= Pr
[
E[T (X)] − T (X) ≥ 5E[T (X)]
8
]
≤ 8
2Var(T (X))
52(E[T (X)])2
(Chevyshev’s inequality)
≤ 8
2 · 812 · 2d
52n2α4
+
82 · 4 · 81
52nα2
(Lemma A.2 and (37))
For n = Ω
(
d1/2
α2
)
, it holds that Pr
[
z4 ≤ n2α24·81
]
≤ 0.05. So with probability 0.9 − 13δ, z4 >
n2α2
324 . Thus, for δ ≤ 0.01 and for the stated value of n, we conclude that with probability 2/3,
Algorithm 3 returns REJECT.
Ignoring the logarithmic factors, the sample complexity is simplified using Claim 4.8.
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Algorithm 3 Efficient Private Gaussian Mean Testing
Require: Sample X = (X(1), . . . ,X(n)) ∈ Rn×d drawn from Pn. Parameters ε, δ, α > 0.
Stage 1: Pre-processing
1: if n < max
{
25 ln dδ ,
5
ε ln
1
δ
}
then return REJECT.
2: Let ci(X)←
n∑
j=1
1{X(j)i ≤ 0} and mi(X)← ci(X)n − 12 for all i ∈ [d].
3: Let r1 ∼ Lap(1/εn) and z1 ← max
i∈[d]
|mi(X)| + r1.
4:
5: if z1 >
√
ln(d/δ)√
n
+ ln(1/δ)εn then return REJECT.
6: Let B ← 3
√
ln ndδ and truncate all samples so that X
(j)
i ∈ [−B,B] ∀i ∈ [d], j ∈ [n].
7: Let X¯ ←∑nj=1X(j).
8:
9: Let r2 ∼ Lap(2B/ε) and z2 ← max
i∈[d]
|X¯i|+ r2.
10:
11: if z2 > 3
√
2n ln ndδ · ln dδ + 6ε
√
ln ndδ ln
1
δ then return REJECT.
12: Let X˜ ← X¯ +R, where R ∼ N (0, σ2Id×d) and σ = B
√
8d ln(5/4δ)
ε .
13: Let ∆Gδ ← 225
(
d ln dδ +
d
nε2
ln2 1δ +
√
nd
√
ln dδ · ln nδ +
√
d
ε ln
1
δ
√
ln nδ
)
ln ndδ .
14: Let r3 ∼ Lap(1/ε) and z3 ← |{j ∈ [n] : |〈X(j), X˜〉| > ∆Gδ + 36dε ln ndδ
√
ln nδ · ln 54δ}|+ r3.
15: if z3 >
ln(1/δ)
ε then return REJECT.
Stage 2: Filtering
16: for j = 1, . . . , n do
17: if |〈X(j), X˜〉| > ∆Gδ + 36dε ln ndδ
√
ln nδ · ln 54δ then
18: Xˆ(j) ← N (j), where N (j) ∼ N (0, Id×d)
19: else
20: Xˆ(j) ← X(j)
Stage 3: Noise addition and thresholding
21: Define the function T (Xˆ) =
∑d
i=1(
¯ˆ
X2i − n).
22: Let r4 ∼ Lap
((
5∆Gδ +
432d
ε ln
nd
δ
√
ln nδ · ln 54δ
)
/ε
)
and z4 ← T (Xˆ) + r4.
23: if z4 >
n2α2
324 then return REJECT
24: return ACCEPT.
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